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Criminals have historically crossed boundaries in an effort to escape
the reach of law enforcement. In response, governments have pursued
extradition policies whereby a person who is charged with a crime in
one jurisdiction may be brought to justice with the aid of the jurisdiction
where the accused is found.' While such solutions are generally
effective in a domestic context, international extradition has been more
problematic.3 Because of the absence of extradition treaties, delays in
effecting extradition, or other barriers, prosecutors and their proxies
have devised an alternative strategy to bring persons accused of crimes
to justice.4 In the United States, officials dubbed the strategy
"extraordinary rendition," 5 an officially recognized but covert policy
authorized by several presidential directives, whereby the U.S.
government or its agents could capture a person accused of a crime and
bring the person to the United States to stand trial.6 There were two
1. For a thorough examination of U.S. extradition policy and practice, see MICHAEL ABBELL,
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES (2004); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2002). For a
historical perspective on U.S. extradition law, see CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, EXTRADITION,
POLITICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
2. A legal basis for inter-state extradition is found both in the U.S. Constitution and in federal
statute. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.2; 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2006). But see Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519, 520 (1952) (relating that Michigan police officers, in violation of the Federal
Kidnapping Act, came into Chicago and "forcibly seized, handcuffed, [and] blackjacked" the
defendant and then took him to Michigan); Austin W. Scott, Jr., CriminalJurisdictionof a State
over a Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. REv. 91, 91
(1953) (noting that "the police practice of out-of-state kidnapping" is "flourishing with some
vigor").
3. The Supreme Court's first modem encounter with government-sanctioned transnational
kidnapping as an alternative to extradition was the case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. 655 (1992). For purposes of this Article, it is no small irony that Alvarez-Machain was
accused of facilitating the torture of a DEA agent in Mexico. Id. at 657.
4. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 437-38 (1886).
In Alvarez-Machain, the Mexican government evidently intended to prosecute the defendant
itself, and therefore did not wish to extradite him. 504 U.S. at 670-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But see PYLE, supra note 1, at 282 (suggesting that Mexican officials withdrew cooperation after
a deal fell apart that would have called for the United States to deport to Mexico a person wanted
by the Mexican government for stealing $500 million from Mexican politicians).
5. The term is, of course, a euphemism for abduction and subsequent transfer designed to
circumvent ordinary extradition procedures. The term was apparently in use at the Department of
Justice by the late 1980s. See Richard Sisk & Patrice O'Shaughnessy, Streetwise Safir's Turn,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 14, 1996, at 7; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 189-90 (2d rev. ed. 1987).
6. See PYLE, supra note 1, at 275; DeNeen L. Brown & Dana Priest, Deported Terror Suspect
Details Torture in Syria; Canadian'sCase Called Typical of CIA, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2003, at
Al; Dana Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2004, at Al. The
directives authorizing rendition remain classified. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule
Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1.It is unclear
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categories of renditions: (1) renditions in which agents of the state
where the person was present seized the individual and surrendered him
or her to agents of another state without using formal or legal processes
and (2) renditions in which other persons conducted the seizure with or
without the awareness or approval of that state.7 The Supreme Court has

long held that the use of means that are illicit, illegal, or in
circumvention of an existing extradition treaty to bring a person into a
court's jurisdiction poses no inherent impediment to assertion of in

personam jurisdiction in criminal cases.8 Perhaps the most famous
international case to affirm this principle was Attorney- General of Israel
v. Eichmann,9 in which Israeli courts cited U.S. case law to support the

conclusion that Adolf Eichmann's abduction in Argentina did not strip
Israeli courts of jurisdiction to try him for war crimes.'" In the 1992 case
of United States v. Alvarez-Machain,1 the Supreme Court's most recent

decision validating this traditional form of extraordinary rendition, the
Court was dismissive of the relevance of the principles of international
law:
Respondent.. .may be correct that respondent's abduction was

"shocking,"

and that it may be in violation of general

international law principles. Mexico has protested the abduction
of respondent through diplomatic notes.... We conclude,

however, that respondent's abduction was not in violation of the
exactly who initiated the rendition program. Compare National Security Threats, Hearing Before
the Senate Armed Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2005) (statement of CIA Director Porter
Goss) [hereinafter National Security Threats] (observing that rendition "is a process that's been
going on for more than 20 years"), and Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Extraordinary Renditions Subject to
Foreign and U.S. Investigations and Oversight, 21 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 188 (2005)
(stating that Reagan first authorized rendition in 1986), with Stephen Grey, America's Gulag,
NEW STATESMAN, May 17, 2004 [hereinafter Grey, Gulag] (contending that rendition was
"invented" by President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger).
7. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 249.
8. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657 (1992). The doctrine applied in the case is "mala captus
bene detentus," defined as the process "whereby national courts will assert in personam
jurisdiction without inquiring into the means by which the presence of the defendant was
secured." BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 250.
9. Attorney-General v. Eichmann, [1961] IsrDC 45(3), translated in 36 INT'L L. REP. 5
(1968), affd Attorney-General v. Eichmann, [1962] IsrSC 16(2033), translated in 36 INT'L L.
REP. 277 (1968).
10. Id. at 45-52; see also PYLE, supra note 1, at 272-73. The court's jurisdiction over
Eichmann was facilitated, because West Germany used his alleged involvement in crimes against
humanity as "a welcome pretext for withholding the customary protection due its citizens
abroad," and therefore did not intervene on Eichmann's behalf. See HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN INJERUSALEM 240 (1964).
11. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico, and
therefore... [t]he fact of respondent's forcible abduction does
not.. .prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for
2
violations of the criminal laws of the United States.1
This cavalier disregard for international law would soon bear fruit in
unexpected ways.
As the United States attempted to strengthen its efforts in the socalled war on terror, 3 officials transformed and expanded the tactic of
extraordinary rendition. This new form of extraordinary rendition
typically targets a person who is not formally charged with any crime in
the United States. Instead, U.S. agents or their proxies seize the person
abroad for transport to the custody of a third country. 4 Today, the term
"extraordinary rendition" is used exclusively as a euphemism to
describe abduction of terror suspects not in order to bring them to

12. Id. at 669-70.
13. See General: "War on Terror" Is "Inaccurate" Labelfor War on Insurgency, INSIDE THE
NAVY, June 20, 2005 ("'This war has a popular label and a political label but it's not accurate,'
said [Lieutenant General Wallace] Gregson[, commander of the U.S. Marines in the Pacific]....
This is no more a war on terrorism than World War II was a war on submarines."). But see
Richard W. Stevenson, PresidentMakes It Clear: PhraseIs "War on Terror," N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 2005, at A 12 (noting that President Bush has rejected alternative terms).
14. The individual may be seized directly by the CIA, or arrested by local authorities, and
then handed over to the CIA. See infra note 18. "High-value" suspects typically remain in custody
in secret detention facilities operated directly by the CIA, and are not transferred to the custody of
third countries. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Priest, Secret Prisons]; James Risen & Thom Shanker, The Struggle
for Iraq: Terror Captives; Hussein Enters Post-9/1 Web of U.S. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2003, at Al; see also Richard Stevenson, White House Says Prisoner Policy Set Humane Tone,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at Al. A thorough discussion of such "ghost detainees" held at "black
sites" is beyond the scope of this Article. Reports that the United States is participating in
enforced disappearances, however, in which U.S. officials deny detainees access to monitoring
agencies, counsel, and their families, raise grave concerns about the risk of torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See Louise Arbour, U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, On Terrorists and Torturers, Human Rights Day Statement (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view0l/3B9B202D5A6DCDBCC 12570D00034CF8
3?opendocument (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). Additionally, the secretive nature of extraordinary
rendition makes it difficult to know whether a person who has disappeared has been transferred to
the custody of another country or whether the person remains in secret CIA custody. While the
issues are intertwined, the primary focus of this Article is rendition of terror suspects to the
custody of third countries. The Council of Europe has initiated an investigation of secret detention
facilities on the territory of its member states under the authority of Article 52 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. See Alleged Secret Detention Centres in Council of Europe
Member States, Standing Comm. Eur. Parl. Ass'n Doc. No. 10748 (2005) [hereinafter Standing
Committee Statement].
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justice in the United States, but rather to transfer them to a third
country. 5
Not only has the purpose of extraordinary rendition evolved, but so
have the procedures regulating the rendition process. Prior to 2001,
strict procedures governed the program. First, the receiving country had
to have issued an arrest warrant for the person. 16 Second, the

administration scrutinized each rendition before senior government
officials granted

approval.

7

Third,

the CIA notified

the local

government, and obtained an assurance from the receiving government
that it would not ill-treat the individual.' The administration has not
disclosed the exact number of renditions, but there is a wide consensus

that the program has expanded since September 2001.19 The expansion
15. See, e.g., Comm. on Int'l Human Rights, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Torture by
Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "ExtraordinaryRenditions, " 60 RECORD
13, 24-25 (2005) [hereinafter N.Y. City Bar] (defining "Extraordinary Rendition" as the "transfer
of an individual, with the involvement of the United States or its agents, to a foreign state in
circumstances that make it more likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment"); see also Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, It's Called Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A 19 (defining extraordinary rendition); Danielle Knight, Outsourcinga
Real Nasty Job, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 23, 2005, at 34.
16. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary
Rendition' Program,NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. Mayer notes that in some cases in the
1990s the United States successfully pressured potential receiving countries to issue arrest
warrants. Id.
17. See All Things Considered: Terrorist Witness Got Low U.S. Protection (National Public
Radio broadcast Feb. 4, 1992) (quoting a Justice Department spokesperson who confirmed that
extraordinary rendition is "decided on a case-by-case basis") (reporter Neal Conan); Tracy
Wilkinson & Bob Drogin, Missing Imam's Trail Said to Lead from Italy to CIA, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2005, at Al ("'Each one had to be built almost as if it's a court case in the United States,'
said [Michael] Scheuer, who from January 1996 to July 1999 ran the [Central Intelligence
A]gency's clandestine unit searching for Osama bin Laden. 'I always assumed if I had 15
lawyers' signatures, it was probably fine."'). According to Scheuer, each rendition under the
Clinton administration was conducted under the close scrutiny of the White House. See Michael
Scheuer, Op-Ed, A FineRendition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at A23.
18. See Wilkinson & Drogin, supra note 17. In some cases, formal approval was sought from
the country where the person was taken. That country frequently provided assistance to transfer
those individuals. E.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of
Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al (describing Albanian cooperation with the
United States in 1998 to transfer suspected members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad to Egypt); cf
Craig Whitlock, CIA Ruse Is Said to Have Damaged Probe in Milan; Italy Allegedly Misled on
Cleric'sAbduction, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at Al (reporting that in 2003 the CIA deliberately
deceived Italian authorities to facilitate the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar).
19. See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations;
'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al ("Thousands have been arrested and held with U.S. assistance
in countries known for brutal treatment of prisoners, the officials said."). Representative Markey
remarked on his repeated requests of the CIA to provide an accurate count of the number of
people transferred. Mayer, supra note 16 (reporting that the CIA has repeatedly refused
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can partly be attributed to President Bush's approval of expedited
0 For
procedures, which afford additional flexibility to the CIA."
example, while U.S. officials may maintain a facade of rendering
suspects to justice, sometimes the receiving country brings charges only
after the CIA seizes the suspect and requests cooperation. Egypt
appears to be the most frequently used receiving country," and other
participants include Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uzbekistan,
and Yemen. 3
Representative Markey's request to provide an accurate count of the number of people
transferred). For evidence that the use of extraordinary rendition has increased since September
11, 2001, see Shannon McCaffrey, CanadianSent to Syrian Prison Disputes U.S. Claims Against
Torture, Knight Ridder Newspapers, Aug. 1, 2004; Craig Whitlock, EuropeansInvestigate CIA
Role in Abductions; Suspects Possibly Taken to Nations that Torture, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,
2005, at Al [hereinafter Whitlock, EuropeansInvestigate]; Wilkinson & Drogin, supra note 17,
at Al. Administration officials have confirmed CIA rendition of 100-150 terror suspects since
September 2001. Torture by Proxy, Editorial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at B12.
20. See Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks to Shift Inmates from Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2005, at Al; Jehl & Johnston, supra note 6. Jehl and Johnston note that this broader CIA
authority was derived from legal opinions and a series of classified amendments to Presidential
Decision Directives. Id.Today extraordinary renditions are allowed simply for purposes of
detention and interrogation; criminal charges are not required. See id. Some countries are
pressured to seize suspects on their own, and then turn them over to the CIA. See, e.g.,
Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 18 (describing Indonesia's participation in the rendition of
Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni). Such arrests may not be entirely legitimate. See John Crewdson
et al., Italy Charges CIA Agents, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2005, at 1 ("'[T]here are arrests, and then
there are arrests,' a senior American intelligence official said with a laugh...."). These pro forma
domestic arrests are effected in an attempt to absolve the CIA of responsibility for unlawful
seizure. Id. In the case of Syrian-born German national Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Moroccan
authorities refused to hand the suspect over to U.S. authorities because the United States had not
filed charges against him. See Peter Finn, Al Qaeda Recruiter Reportedly Tortured; Ex-Inmate in
Syria Cites Others'Accounts, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at A14. In the case of Wahab al-Rawi,
British intelligence agency MI5 lacked sufficient evidence to arrest the Iraqi-born British citizen
for reported associations with an al Qaeda suspect in London. See Grey, Gulag, supra note 6.
When al-Rawi left London for the Gambia on a business trip in November 2002, however, MI5
tipped off the CIA, and he was subsequently arrested and detained by Gambian secret police and
questioned by a U.S. agent. See id. He was then flown to Syria on a CIA-chartered Gulfstream jet.
See Stephen Grey, US.Accused of 'Torture Flights', SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 2004, at
24 [hereinafter Grey, Torture Flights].
21. See Priest & Gellman, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 18; Mayer, supra note 16. But see Arieh
O'Sullivan, Jordanian Intelligence Usurps Mossad as CIA's Best Regional Ally, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 13, 2005, at 3 (describing Jordan's intelligence services as "a hub for 'extraordinary
renditions"' and quoting a former CIA official saying that Jordan "is at the top of our list of
foreign partners").
23. See Finn, supra note 20 (Syria); Grey, Torture Flights, supra note 20 (Pakistan); Priest &
Gellman, supra note 19 (Jordan, Saudi Arabia); Don Van Natta Jr., Threats and Responses:
Interrogations;Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2003, at 1 [hereinafter Van Natta, Questioning] (Morocco); Don Van Natta Jr., U.S. Recruits a
Rough Ally to be a Jailer, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Van Natta, Recruits]
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The Bush administration has asserted that renditions are vital to the

nation's defense.24 One former CIA official argued that "the rendition
program has been the single-most successful American counterterrorism
program since 1995. "25 The CIA expanded its use of extraordinary

rendition to send suspects to third countries in the mid-1990s, when the
Clinton administration gave it responsibility for dismantling al Qaeda
cells. 26 Because the CIA lacked police powers and detention facilities,

and because the White House did not want to bring the suspects into the
U.S. legal system, the CIA enlisted the assistance of allies to arrest and
detain terror suspects.2" Today the official purposes of rendition appear28

to be immobilizing terrorism suspects and "facilitating interrogation.
Under both the Clinton and Bush administrations, officials have been

willing to accept assurances from the receiving country that suspects
will be treated fairly and not tortured.29 Officials claim that foreign

allies facilitate interrogation:
(Uzbekistan); Amnesty Int'l, United States of America / Yemen, Secret Detention in CIA "Black
Sites," Nov. 2005, at 1, 7-8, 17 (Yemen, Jordan).
24. Zagaris, supra note 6.
25. Talk of the Nation: Policy of ExtraordinaryRendition (National Public Radio broadcast
Apr. 7, 2005) (Michael Scheuer) [hereinafter Scheuer, Talk of the Nation]. Scheuer was chief of
the CIA's bin Laden unit under the Clinton administration. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. ("[T]he program was assigned by President Clinton and Mr. Berger, Richard
Clarke to the CIA in 1995... .[a]nd we said, 'Where would you like them taken?.. We don't have
police authority. We don't have prisons. Where do you want them to go?' And they said, 'Over to
you.' So.. they left it up to us.").
28. Jack Goldsmith, Draft Memorandum, Permissibility of Relocating Certain 'Protected
Persons' from Occupied Iraq, Mar. 19, 2004, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAIB 367, 368 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE
TORTURE PAPERS]; Helen Thomas, 'Ghost Detainees' Should Haunt CIA, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, May 5, 2005, at B6 (quoting President Bush); All Things Considered:Legal No
Man's Land Created by the Detention of Terror Suspects by US. Authorities (National Public
Radio broadcast Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter All Things Considered, 3/8/05] ("[I]f they have
information that can help us prevent attacks from happening in the first place, we have an
obligation to learn more about what they know.") (statement of White House Spokesman Scott
McClellan); Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Remarks Upon Her Departure for Europe
(Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm12005/57602.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006)
[hereinafter Rice, 12/5/05] ("For decades, the United States.. [has] used 'renditions' to transport
terrorist suspects from the country where they were captured to their home country or to other
countries where they can be questioned, held, or brought to justice.").
29. See Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Press Availability at the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57805.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2006) ("[I]t is our obligation if we have a concern, to seek assurances from any place to
which we are transferring people that they will not be tortured."); Scheuer, supra note 17
(observing that when CIA agents told Clinton White House officials that rendition to Egypt or
other countries may result in improper treatment, "[t]hey usually listened, nodded, and then
inserted a legal nicety by insisting that each country to which the agency delivered a detainee
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not because of their coercive questioning techniques, but because
of their cultural affinity with the captives.... [T]heir intelligence
services can develop a culture of intimacy that Americans
cannot. They may use interrogators who speak the captive's
Arabic dialect and often use the prospects of shame and the
reputation of the captive's family to goad the captive into
talking."a
Officials offer other justifications for extraordinary renditions. Some
diplomats argue that in predominantly Muslim countries, secrecy avoids
potential fundamentalist backlash that could arise if the public were to
learn that the United States was involved in an extradition. 3 Others
argue that rendition avoids lengthy court battles and reduces the
likelihood that the suspect's associates will learn of the capture.32
Rendition is also endorsed as a cost-saving alternative to housing
suspects in U.S.-run facilities.33
More realistically, rendition may arguably be a next-best alternative
when criminal prosecution in the United States would be undesirable.
Criminal prosecution could require the government to disclose closely
guarded intelligence.34 Even if intelligence is not at risk, prosecution
could become altogether legally impossible if no U.S. officer could
swear in court that the suspect was never ill-treated subsequent to
would have to pledge it would treat him according to the rules of its own legal system."); R.
Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales Defends Transfer of Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A3.
Similar safeguards are required in traditional extradition cases, but they too are criticized as
inadequate. See PYLE, supra note 1, at 319.
30. Priest & Gellman, supra note 19. Another commentator observed that foreign
interrogators may be able to exact "emotional leverage" that U.S. interrogators cannot, and that
such leverage may be produced with the use of "family pressure." David Ignatius, Op-Ed,
'Rendition' Realities, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2005, at A21. Reference to the use of family
members to facilitate interrogation is disturbing in light of the most recent State Department
Country Report for one of the countries participating in the rendition program, which noted,
"There were reports that security personnel forced prisoners to watch relatives being tortured in
order to extract confessions." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2004, SYRIA (2005) [hereinafter Syria Country Report].
31. See Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 18.
32. See id.
33. See Herbert, supra note 15 ("U.S. taxpayers should not necessarily be on the hook for
their judicial and incarceration costs.") (quoting Pete Jeffries, communications director for House
Speaker Dennis Hastert, when asked why Hastert does not support a bill to prohibit extraordinary
rendition); Jehl & Johnston, supra note 6, at 1. One editorial responded to these arguments with
disgust: "The idea that this is a productivity initiative would be comical if the issue were not so
tragically serious." Torture by Proxy, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A22.
34. See Scott Shane, Detainee's Suit Gains Support from Jet's Log, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2005, at Al.
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arrest.3" The U.S. legal system prohibits the government from admitting
evidence obtained through torture or other ill-treatment, and therefore
post-rendition criminal prosecution would present problems.3 6
The most consistent and pointed charge against extraordinary
rendition is that it is a means of "outsourcing torture."37 Many former
CIA officials concede that they were aware that renditions resulted in
torture; some admit that a goal of rendition was to use interrogation
techniques that were beyond the legal authority of U.S. questioners.3"
35. Scheuer, Talk of the Nation, supra note 25 (discussing limited knowledge U.S. officials
have of circumstances surrounding arrests).
36. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 564, 540-41 (1961); 10 U.S.C. § 984r(b) (2006).
But see 10 U.S.C. § 984r(c) (authorizing in some circumstances the use of statements obtained
through coercion); S. 576, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (prohibiting military tribunals from using
statements obtained by coercion); Douglas Jehl & Eric Lichtblau, Shift on Suspect Is Linked to
Role of Qaeda Figures,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at At (reporting that Administration officials
decided to charge Jose Padilla with lesser crimes because of "insurmountable" concerns about the
use of testimony from al Qaeda leaders who had been ill-treated during questioning). Likewise,
British courts do not admit evidence obtained in violation of international law. A and Others v.
Sec. of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL 71, 34 (appeal taken from [2004] CA EWCA
Civ. 1123) (rejecting use of "the fruits of torture inflicted in breach of international law") (lead
opinion of Lord Bingham). But see Atuar v. United States, No. 04-7731, 2005 WL 3134081 at
*5-6 (4th Cir. Nov. 23, 2005) (holding that coerced testimony may be considered in extradition
hearings); United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373 (E.D. Va. 2005) (denying
defendant's motion to suppress statements made to Saudi officials while in Saudi custody,
rejecting his claim that Saudi officials used torture to coerce his testimony); Detainees: PanelI of
a Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. (June 15, 2005) (colloquy between
Senator Russ Feingold and J. Michael Wiggins, Deputy Attorney General responsible for the
Department of Justice Civil Division, in which Wiggins stated that "tribunals are free to test the
weight of [the] evidence" that is procured through torture). Recent reports indicate that
Guantfnamo defendants may face difficulties in demonstrating that evidence was obtained
through torture. See Neil A. Lewis, Two ProsecutorsFaulted Trialsfor Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2005 ("[Air Force Prosecuting Attorney at Guantfinamo] Captain [John] Carr's e-mail
message also said that some evidence that at least one of the four defendants [at Guantbnamo] had
been brutalized had been lost and that other evidence on the same issue had been withheld.").
When confronted by a representative from the U.K. consulate in Uzbekistan about the use of
intelligence resulting from torture in Uzbek prisons, the CIA head of station in Uzbekistan said
that the CIA didn't see that as a problem. CBS News: CIA Flying Suspects to Torture? (CBS
television broadcast, Mar. 6, 2005) (reporting statements during a 60 Minutes broadcast)
[hereinafter CBS News]; Regardless of the context in which it may be used, evidence obtained
through torture is inherently suspect. See Ignatius, supra note 30.
37. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 15; Torture by Proxy, L.A. TIMES, supra note 19; Torture by
Proxy, N.Y. TIMES, supra note 33.
38. See Stephen Grey & Andrew Buncombe, How Britain Helps the CIA Run Secret Torture
Flights, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 10, 2005, at 8; Jehl & Johnston, supra note 6; Priest &
Gellman, supra note 19; see also Suzanne Goldenberg, CIA Rendition Flights: US Defence of
Tactic Makes No Sense Says Legal Expert, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 6, 2005, at 5 ("Rendition
doesn't become a tool in the war against terror unless people are being sent to a place where they
can be interrogated harshly.") (quoting Professor David Luban). While Egypt was an early and
eager partner in the Clinton administration's rendition program, see Mayer, supra note 16,
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Nonetheless, CIA officials defend the practice as consistent with the
law.39
The unspoken subtext to the administration's defense of
extraordinary rendition is the mistaken assumption that torture and other
forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment may extract useful
information from detainees.4 ° Yet intelligence experts and specialists
President Clinton subsequently cut off funding and cooperation with Egypt's general intelligence
service due to the country's failure to respect lawful boundaries. Priest & Gellman, supra note 19.
One Bush administration official relating this history quipped, "You can be sure...that we are not
spending a lot of time on that now." Id. According to one U.S. official who has been directly
involved in transferring suspects into foreign hands, "We don't kick the [expletive] out of them.
We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them." Id; see also John
Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26 ("[Former CIA Director
George] Tenet suggested [to Congress] it might be better sometimes for such suspects to remain
in the hands of foreign authorities, who might be able to use more aggressive interrogation
methods."); Brown & Priest, supra note 6; Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 18. Former CIA
agent Bob Baer, who was a covert agent in the Middle East in the mid-1990s, explained that
certain countries served distinct purposes in the rendition scheme: "If you want a serious
interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to
Syria. If you want someone to disappear-never to see them again-you send them to Egypt."
Grey, supra note 6.
39. See, e.g., Brown & Priest, supra note 6; Jehl & Johnston, supra note 6; Dana Priest, ExCIA Official Defends Detention Policies; Careful Vetting, Approval Cited, WASH. POST, Oct. 27,
2004, at A2 1; Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of U.S.Interrogation; Long History of
Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al; Thomas,
supra note 28. In spite of asserted benign intentions underlying rendition, the Defense
Department has officially approved of an interrogation technique called "false flag," in which a
questioner misleads a detainee to create the impression that the detainee is in the hands of a third
country. One memorandum describes as a "Category I" technique: "Interrogator identity. The
interviewer may identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a
country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees." Jerald Phifer, Request for Approval of
Counter-Resistance Strategies, Joint Task Force, Memorandum for Commander, 170, Oct. 11,
2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28, at 227. This tactic was approved by
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. See William J. Haynes II, Counter-Resistance Techniques,
Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Nov. 27, 2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 28, at 236. The memorandum was signed and approved by Rumsfeld on December 2,
2002. Id. While approval for other tactics was later rescinded, Category I techniques remain
permissible. See Donald Rumsfeld, Counter-Resistance Techniques, Memorandum for
Commander USSOUTHCOM, Jan. 14, 2003, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28,
at 239; see also Priest & Gellman, supra note 19 (confirming CIA use of the false flag tactic).
Use of this method of interrogation implicitly acknowledges that all parties involved recognize
that rendition itself is likely to result in torture.
40. See, e.g., Scott McClellan, White House Spokesman, Press Briefing (Dec. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ncws/releases/2005/12/20051206-3.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2006) (failing to answer after being asked six times in succession to explain the purpose
of rendition, while maintaining that "intelligence saves lives"); Rice, supra note 28 ("We must
question them to gather potentially significant, life-saving, intelligence."); Pre-9/ll Intelligence
Failures: Hearing Before the House and Senate Intelligence Comms., 107th Cong. (Sept. 26,
2002) (statement of former chief of CIA Counter-Terrorist Center, Coffer Black) ("Operational
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who work with torture victims repeatedly confirm that torture does not
work.41 In fact, torture runs the risk of creating more enemies and
steeling the resolve of the victims' friends, family, and other individuals
who may already oppose the United States.42 Torture also is likely to
generate false leads that officials may use to justify additional torture to
extract information from others.43 Additionally, the administration may

rely on information derived from torture to justify otherwise suspect
foreign policy operations. For example, a rendition to Egypt produced
flawed intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs which U.S. officials
cited when they attempted to garner support for the 2003 war in Iraq.4 4

Some observers argue that by abandoning the original purpose of
extraordinary rendition-bringing a person accused of a crime to a
flexibility: This is a very highly classified area. All I want to say is that there was 'before' 9/11
and 'after' 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off. Nearly 3,000 al-Qa'ida terrorists and their
supporters have been detained."), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002 -hr/
092602black.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006); National Security Threats, supra note 6 (CIA
Director Porter Goss) ("I can't say in every circumstance.... I can't say in every instance that
somebody who is tortured gives you good or bad information.").
41. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Army, Field Manual No. 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, ch.
1, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fmnfm34-52/ [hereinafter
Army Field Manual]:
The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and
inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor
condoned by the U.S. Government.... [T]he use of force is a poor technique, as it yields
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source
to say whatever lie thinks the interrogator wants to hear.
See also Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 109th Cong. (July 27, 2005) (statement of Senator Durbin) (noting that the FBI
criticizes torture as ineffective); National Security Threats, supra note 6 ("I would agree that
torture is not proper interrogation, and it doesn't give you the results that professional
interrogation would bring you."); Nomination of Alberto Gonzales to be the Attorney General of
the United States: Hearingof the Senate Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2005) (statement
of Douglas Johnson, executive director of the Center for Victims of Torture) [hereinafter
Gonzales Nomination Hearing] ("[T]orture does not yield reliable information.... [T]orture will
not be used only against the guilty."); Letter from General Joseph Hoar et al., to John McCain
(Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/l0/051003-1etter-to-senmccain.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) (describing the Army Field Manual as "the gold
standard"). Even speculations about the "ticking time bomb" scenario, see Gonzales Nomination
Hearing, supra, that some may use in an attempt to justify torture, are not applicable to
extraordinary rendition, which does not involve an urgent need for information.
42. See Michael Ignatieff, Lesser Evils, N.Y.TIMES MAG., May 2, 2004, at 46 ("If you want
to create terrorists, torture is a pretty sure way to do so."); Michael Ignatieff, Evil Under
Interrogation, FIN. TIMES (London), May 15, 2004, at 25 ("Torture may help, if not to create
terrorists, then to harden them in their hostility to the state responsible for their suffering.").
43. See Gonzales Nomination Hearing,supra note 41, at 522 (statement of Douglas Johnson)
(observing that people give up names of innocent people in order to stop their own torture).
44. See Douglas Jehl, Qaeda-Iraq Link U.S. Cited Is Tied to Coercion Claim, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2005, at Al.
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country to face trial-the United States has painted itself into a comer.
While the administration pressured the CIA to capture and incapacitate
terror suspects, "the policy guys hadn't thought through what we're
going to do with these people for the rest of their lives. 45 Interrogation
subsequent to extraordinary rendition is only potentially useful for
identifying future terror plots and additional suspects to detain;
rendition is not designed for criminal prosecution. 46 Hence,
extraordinary rendition serves multiple purposes: it gets suspects out of
U.S. hands, purportedly facilitates investigation of terror plots, and
indefinitely incapacitates 47 suspected terrorists. Extraordinary rendition
45. All Things Considered, 3/8/05, supra note 28 (Mike Scheuer); see also Priest, Secret
Prisons, supra note 14 (quoting a former CIA officer describing the 'secret detention system as
"reactive" and lacking a "grand strategy").
46. See, e.g., All Things Considered: Terrorism Cases: Highly Complex and a Bit Bizarre
(Minnesota Public Radio broadcast July 25, 2005), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/
features/2005/07/25_stawickie-prosecuting/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) (quoting a former CIA
attorney, who explained that high-level al Qaeda operatives are being interrogated, and that "the
U.S. deals with [them] outside the criminal system") (reporter Elizabeth Stawicki); Mayer, supra
note 16 ("The criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects has not been a priority for the Bush
Administration.").
47. See Dana Priest, Long-Term Plan Sought for TerrorSuspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005,
at Al. Indefinite detention is subject to several limitations under U.S. and international law. The
Second Circuit has held, for example, that the Material Witness Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006),
does not allow for indefinite detention. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 62 (2d Cir.
2003). In spite of this restriction on indefinite detention, § 412(a)(6) of the USA PATRIOT Act
potentially allows the indefinite detention of persons ordered removed who'"threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person." 8 U.S.C. §
1226a(a)(6) (2006). The Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004),
suggested that while prisoners may be detained until the end of hostilities, "[i]f the practical
circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel."
Indefinite detention is also prohibited under international law. The Geneva Conventions
impose limits on detention of POWs and civilians. See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, art. 118; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 43. The European Court of Human Rights has found that some
forms of detention are in violation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which limits indefinite and secret detention. In Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur.
2, 55 (1988), the Court held that detention may violate Article 5 if a suspect is
Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
not promptly brought before a judge after detention begins. Indefinite detention also falls within
the U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. res.
47/133, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49, art. 9 (1992), which sets forth
the "right to a prompt and effective judicial remedy as a means of determining the whereabouts or
state of health of persons deprived of their liberty and/or identifying the authority ordering or
carrying out the deprivation of liberty." The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 9, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, establishes that persons detained are
entitled to be brought promptly before a court and that they must be released either if no trial
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attempts to compensate for the administration's failure to foresee an
end-game when it abandoned the goal of criminally prosecuting terror
suspects in U.S. courts.48
The CIA may resort more frequently to underground techniques, like
extraordinary rendition, due to increasing political scrutiny of CIA and
Defense Department counter-terrorist programs.4 9 First, the CIA is
facing unwanted attention. The public increasingly is concerned about
CIA interrogation tactics, the United Nations launched an investigation
of the CIA's secret detention facilities, and the Senate has called for
heightened congressional oversight of those facilities.5" Also, CIA
officials fear that changes in administrative standards on permissible
interrogation techniques may leave agents responsible5' for acts that
they were led to believe had been thoroughly vetted by top
administration lawyers. Moreover, the Defense Department is taking
steps to reduce the prisoner population at Guantdnamo,52 and the
Pentagon perceives that increasing "red tape" is entangling its own
interrogations.5 3 Public and Congressional5 4 concerns about reports of
takes place within a reasonable time or if the detention is otherwise unlawful. Amnesty
International has noted that some forms of indefinite detention constitute torture. See Amnesty
Int'l, supra note 23, at 14.
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. See Reuel Marc Gerecht, What's the Matter with Gitmo?, WKLY. STANDARD, Jul. 4, 2005
[hereinafter Gerecht, Gitmo] ("[T]he current liberal outcry against Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo
could well increase the use of rendition...."). Professor Bassiouni, writing in an updated edition
of his text in November 2001, demonstrated great foresight in predicting the connection between
political events and the use of extraordinary rendition: "The tragic events of September 11, 2001
in the terror-violence attacks in New York and Washington have unleashed a 'war' on terrorism.
This will likely mean that the abduction of 'terrorists' will be seen as justifiable. This
consequence of terrorism will be a loss to the rule of law." BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 251-52.
50. See Noah Feldman, Ugly Americans: The Laws of a War Against Evil, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 30, 2005, at 23 (discussing public concern about CIA interrogation tactics); Douglas Jehl,
Senate Is Set to Require White House to Account for Secret Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005
[hereinafter Jehl, Secret Prisons];Daniel McGrory, American "Ghost Prisoners"May Yield Vital
Clues, TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 2005, at 6 (discussing U.N. intention to investigate U.S. secret
prisons).
51. It is unclear whether responsibility includes civil liability under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See, e.g., Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 957 F.2d
886, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1992); infra notes 281-287 (discussing liability issues for CIA agents and
private contractors).
52. See Empty Beds, Empty Stomachs; Guant6namoBay, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2005 (noting
that U.S. officials are increasingly transferring detainees into the custody of their home
countries).
53. See Heather Mac Donald, How to InterrogateTerrorists, CITY J., Winter 2005, available
at http://www.city-journal.org/html/151l-terrorists.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
54. A group of Republican Senators led by Senator John McCain introduced a series of
amendments to the 2006 defense authorization bill that would require all defense personnel
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ill-treatment at Abu Ghraib and Guantdnamo may force the Bush
administration to pursue alternatives that attempt to evade public
attention, including an expanded rendition program.55
In this context, it is critically important to examine the legality of
extraordinary rendition. This Article establishes that extraordinary
rendition violates the Convention Against Torture and domestic
prohibitions on torture and conspiracy to commit torture. 56 It is now
U.S. officials who are attempting to evade the long arm of the law.

throughout the world to follow the guidelines in the Army Field Manual, supra note 41, when
interrogating detainees, and would prohibit defense personnel from engaging in cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment of prisoners, regardless of where they are detained. See Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. §§ 8154-55 (as engrossed in the
Senate, 2005); Amendment to Provide for Uniform Standards for the Interrogation of Persons
Under the Detention of the Department of Defense, S. Amdt. 1557, to amend National Defense
Authorization Act for 2006, S. 1042, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S12380 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
2005); and Amendment to Prohibit Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of
Persons Under the Custody or Control of the United States Government, S. Amdt. 1556, to amend
National Defense Authorization Act for 2006, S. 1042, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S12380
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 2005). President Bush threatened to veto any legislation that imposes such
conditions, and the White House engaged in intense lobbying in an attempt to block introduction
of the amendments, but ultimately the McCain amendments prevailed. See Brian Knowlton, Bush
and McCain Reach Deal on Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005; Reuters,
Bush Signs Anti-Terrorism, PrisonerTreatment Laws, Dec. 31, 2005. The amendments might not
affect the practice of extraordinary rendition. See Helen Thomas, Bush Plays Hardball in
Refusing to Stop Abuse of Detainees, REC. (Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario), July 29, 2005, at All
("Unfortunately, [the McCain proposals] would not cover the CIA's shameful practice of
'extraordinary rendition' in which we send detainees to other countries for possible torture."); see
also Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, Pentagon Plans Tighter Control of Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2005 (reporting that newly approved Defense Department interrogation guidelines would
only apply to CIA officers who are interrogating military prisoners). The Bush Administration
advocated a CIA exemption to the McCain Amendment's prohibition on the use of torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. See Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on
Detainee Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at Al. During negotiations in the Senate, the
McCain amendment was linked to another amendment that would strip Guantdinamo detainees of
access to U.S. courts under the habeas statute. See id.
55. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 5; Gerecht, Gitmo, supra note 49 ("For a Bush
administration under siege, rendition may well seem a safer, quieter way of doing what the CIA
and the military deem necessary."); Reuel Marc Gerecht, Why the CIA Shouldn 't Outsource
Interrogationsto Countries that Torture, WKiLY. STANDARD, May 16, 2005 [hereinafter Gerecht,
CIA] ("[R]endition eliminates the Guantanamo detention problem."). But see Carol D. Leonnig &
Eric Rich, US Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006 (noting that soon after
the United States transferred fourteen "high value" detainees to Guantdnamo, Congress enacted
the Military Commissions Act, which purported to strip those detainees of the right to gain access
to U.S. courts).
56. For discussion of other domestic and international laws applicable to the practice of
extraordinary rendition, see David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123 (2006).
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Part I of this Article describes the Convention Against Torture and its
provisions, and then examines the scope of the prohibition on torture
under U.S. law. Then Part I demonstrates that extraordinary rendition
constitutes a criminal conspiracy to commit torture. Part I concludes by
addressing the policy justifications for extraordinary rendition and the
use of diplomatic assurances to evade criminal liability under the torture
statute. Part II examines the domestic mechanisms available in the
United States to address extraordinary rendition, primarily focusing on
the use of habeas corpus to challenge extraordinary rendition. The
Conclusion addresses the legal climate that led to justifications for
extraordinary rendition, and the unintended consequences of the policy
for U.S. officials and the global community.
I.

EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND THE FEDERAL TORTURE STATUTE

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment in 1984, and the Convention entered into force in 1987.17 It
defines torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person."5 The pain or
suffering must be "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity."59 Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits States
Parties from "expel[ling], return[ing] ('refouler') or extradit[ing] a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 60 Article 15
requires States Parties to "ensure that any statement which is established
to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence
in any proceedings."' 6 Further, Article 16 requires every State Party to
"undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of

57. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S.Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
58. Id. art. 1.
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 3.
61. Id. art. 15; accord A & Others v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL 71
(appeal taken from [2004] CA EWCA (Civ.) 1123), 39 (articulating the rationale for excluding
evidence obtained by means of torture).
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cruel, inhuman or 62 degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture.
The Torture Convention calls for States Parties to take steps to
implement the Convention. Article 2 requires "effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in
any territory under [the State Party's] jurisdiction., 63 Article 4 obligates
States Parties to criminalize not only all acts of torture, but also all
"attempt[s] to commit torture" and "an act by any person which
constitutes complicity or participation in torture."' Perhaps most
importantly, Article 2 prohibits States Parties from invoking any
exceptional circumstances to justify torture.65
A.

U.S. Acceptance of the Convention Against Torture

The United States ratified the Torture Convention in October 1994,
having enacted legislation to implement the Convention. The Senate
made several explicit reservations, understandings, and declarations in
its advice and consent to the Convention. On the suggestion of the
Clinton administration, the Senate adopted a reservation limiting U.S.
obligations under Article 16 to "prohibitions as defined by the 5th, 8th,
and/or 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution."66 The United States
further submitted an understanding to the Convention stating:
(a) That with reference to Article 1, the United States
understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged
mental harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat
that another person will imminently be subject to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of
mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Convention against Torture, supra note 57, art. 16.
Jd. art. 2, 1.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 2, 2.
S.REP. No. 102-30, at 21 (1991).
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(b) That the United States understands that the definition of
torture in Article 1 is intended to apply only to acts directed
against persons in the offender's custody or physical control.67
The Senate also declared that the United States understands the
"substantial grounds" standard in Article 3 to be limited to situations
where it is "more likely than not" that the person will be tortured.6 8 In
another declaration, the Senate stated that Articles 1 through 16 of the
Convention are not self-executing, but noted that "[t]he majority of the
obligations to be undertaken by the United States are already covered by
existing law."69
The Senate rejected one important understanding originally proposed
by President Reagan. He had suggested a clarification that the United
States "understands that paragraph 2 of Article 2," the non-derogability
provision of the Torture Convention, "does not preclude the availability
of relevant common law defenses, including but not limited to selfdefense and defense of others."7 The Senate's rejection of this proposal
indicates that the United States fully accepts the non-derogability of the
prohibition on torture. Therefore, critics must view any attempt to carve
exceptions out of U.S. obligations under the Convention in light of the
fact that the United States accepted in full that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever... may be invoked as a justification of
torture."'"
67. CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990) (U.S. reservations, declarations, and
understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment).
68. Convention Against Torture, supra note 57. This standard is applied in both removal and
extradition proceedings. See id. arts. 8, 12. It is also the stated standard guiding the Department of
State in its role in the transfer of Department of Defense detainees from Guantdnamo to the
custody of other countries. See Pierre-Richard Prosper, Declaration, el-Mashad v. Bush, Civ.
Action No. 05-0270 (JR), at 5,
8, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
45849.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). The U.S. standard is arguably much narrower than the
language of Article 3, which reads, "No State party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture." Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 3(1).
69. S.REP. No. 102-30, at21 (1991).
70. George P. Shultz, Summary and Analysis of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Letter of Submittal to the President, May
10, 1988, reprinted in Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 6 [hereinafter Torture Convention
Transmittal Document].
71. Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 2(2). This interpretation contradicts U.S.
policy on torture from 2002 to 2004. See Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 23402340A, Aug. 1, 2002, reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28, 172, 207-13 (outlining
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A reservation, to be valid, must be consistent with the object and
purpose of a treaty.7 2 The United Nations Committee Against Torture
expressed concern that the "reservation lodged to article 16, in violation
of the Convention would have the effect of limiting application of the
Convention."73 In 2000, the United States responded to this concern by
stating that it made the reservation because it found the term "degrading
treatment" to be ambiguous.74 In 2005, however, the U.S. response to
this continuing concern was somewhat more hostile:
The Committee's use of the phrase "in violation of the
Convention" is confusing as a matter of international treaty law.
By their nature, reservations alter the scope of treaty obligations
assumed by States Parties. Accordingly, reservations that are not
prohibited by a treaty or by the applicable international law rules
relating to reservations are not violations of that treaty. As the
Torture Convention does not prohibit the making of a reservation
and as the reservation in question is not incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention, there is nothing in the
U.S. reservation that would be unlawful or otherwise constitute a
violation of the Convention.7 5
The intent of the U.S. reservation to Article 16 is unclear. While the
government states that the Convention's provision is vague, the
Supreme Court's own standard is to prohibit actions which "shock.. .the
conscience" of the Court under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.76

legal arguments in favor of use of the defenses of necessity and self-defense as defenses to the
statutory prohibition on torture). The defenses were repudiated in a memorandum issued on
December 30, 2004. See Daniel Levin, Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Dec. 30, 2004, at 17,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006); see
also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1703-09 (2005) (describing the Bybee memorandum's "definitional
shenanigans").
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980, art. 19.
73. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of
America,
175-80, U.N. Doc. A/55/44, (May 15, 2000).
74. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention,
United States of America,
303-04, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000).
75. See Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against
Torture, Submitted to the Committee Against Torture, May 6, 2005, fJ 73, http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/45738.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Second U.S. Report to Torture
Committee].
76. Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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This standard has been sharply criticized,77 and has led to the puzzling
conclusion that while pumping a person's stomach to obtain proof of
drug possession shocks the conscience," a mandatory blood test to
prove alcohol consumption does not.79 It is unclear whether these
precedents are any less vague than the language of Article 16 itself.
The reservation may be used in an attempt to limit the provisions of
Article 16 to conduct within the territory of the fifty states of the United
States. If this reason constitutes the newly concocted foundation for the
U.S. reservation to Article 16, then the reservation is inconsistent with
the purpose of the treaty, which is to prohibit torture everywhere and
other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and treatment
within the jurisdiction of the ratifying nation. The U.S. military's choice
of Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba, as the detention site for terror suspects is
inherently suspect in this regard because the United States has claimed
that GuantAnamo is not within the territory or jurisdiction of the United
States." Given the publicized reports of ill-treatment at the detention
site and disclosures of secret CIA detention facilities located overseas, it
seems likely that the United States attempted to evade both the scope of
the Constitution and of Article 16 by selecting those locations for
detention. Accordingly the reservation to Article 16 is not valid because
it violates the object and purpose of the treaty, which aims to prohibit all
forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
resulting from the acts of States Parties to the Convention.
The Senate determined that Congress needed only minimal enacting
legislation to comply with the Convention, because "any act of torture
falling within the Convention would in fact be criminally prosecutable
in every jurisdiction within the United States."'" At the time of
ratification, however, existing law was not "sufficiently far-reaching to
77. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
78. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
79. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1957).
80. See Brief for the Respondents at 21-25, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03334, 03-343); see also Glenn Kessler & Josh White, Rice Seeks to Clarify Policy on Prisoners,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2005, at Al (reporting that the administration policy is to abide by Article
16 extraterritorially, "even if such compliance is not legally required"); So, What's All the Fuss?
ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2005 (noting that Condoleezza Rice's statements suggest that the
administration has asserted the existence of a loophole allowing the CIA to transfer detainees for
the purpose of interrogation using cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
81. Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention: United States of America, 1 101, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/23/Add.5 (Feb.
9, 2000) [hereinafter First U.S. Report to Torture Committee].
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satisfy the additional requirements of [A]rticle 5 concerning jurisdiction
over acts of torture by United States nationals wherever committed or
over such offences committed elsewhere."8 2 Therefore, Congress
enacted the Torture Statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A.83
Section 2340 defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering...upon another person within his custody or
physical control. 84 According to the Senate Report on the legislation,
the definition "emanates directly from [A]rticle 1 of the Convention."8 5
Section 2340A extends criminal jurisdiction in accordance with Article
5 of the Torture Convention:
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person
from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by
death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.86
The Senate Report strongly suggests that the Senate intended the
geographic scope of jurisdiction to be all-encompassing; the statute was
only necessary for areas outside the reach of existing state and federal
laws prohibiting acts which constitute torture.87 The statute affords
jurisdiction for the offense if the offender is a U.S. national, or if the
offender is present in the United States.88 Further, Section 2340A
specifies that a person found guilty of conspiring to commit torture is
subject to almost all of the same penalties as a person committing
torture.8 9

82. Id. 44.
83. See id. 188.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).
85. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, S. REP. No. 103-107, at 58 (1993), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 302, 366.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a).
87. See S. REP. No. 103-107, at 59:
[Section 2340A] applies only to acts of torture committed outside the United States.
Since "United States" is defined to include any registered United States aircraft or ship,
the provision is not applicable to these particular conveyances when they are outside of
the geographical territory of the United States. These places would, as would acts of
torture committed within the United States, be covered by existing applicable federal
and state statutes.
88. § 2340A(b).
89. § 2340A(c) (excepting the death penalty from the possible sanctions for conspiracy). This
section was added in a 2001 amendment. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT
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Congress also enacted legislation to implement Article 3 of the
Torture Convention. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act

of 1998 (FARRA) articulated this policy:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite,
or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a

country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture,
regardless of whether the person is physically present in the
United States.9"
FARRA also directed executive agencies to prescribe regulations to

implement Article 3; as a result, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Justice, and the State Department issued regulations
implementing Article 3 in the context of removal and extradition

proceedings. 9' Those regulations, as interpreted by subsequent judicial
opinions, extend the definition of torture to include "acts of torture
committed by or at the acquiescence of a public official or other person

acting in an official capacity."92 Acquiescence requires the official to
have awareness of the activity constituting torture prior to its
occurrence, and then to breach his or her legal responsibility to
intervene.93 "Willful blindness" may be sufficient to constitute
acquiescence when the official's government is able to stop the torture.94

Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 811(g), 115 Stat. 272, 381 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2340A(c)
(2006)).
90. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242(a), in Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277
(1998).
91. See id. § 2242(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18, 208.30, 208.31, 235.8; 22 C.F.R. pt. 95.
Also relevant to an analysis of domestic compliance with the Convention Against Torture is the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which was enacted prior to Senate advice and consent to
the Torture Convention, and allows U.S. citizens to bring civil actions seeking damages for
torture committed against them by individuals acting under authority of foreign nations. 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006). Discussion of the Torture Victim Protection Act is beyond the scope
of this Article.
92. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF
U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING REMOVAL OF ALIENS 5 (Cong. Research Serv.,
CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32276, Mar. 11, 2004) (emphasis omitted) available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31351 .pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
93. Id. For relevant case law, see id. at 5 n.29.
94. Id. at 5.
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Scope of the Statutory Prohibitionof Torture

In spite of the legislative branch's intention to provide universal
criminal jurisdiction over acts of torture committed by U.S. nationals,
there are arguably at least two gaps in the scope of U.S. efforts to
comply with the nation's obligations under the Torture Convention.
The first gap appears to be a fluke. In 2000, Congress enacted the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), which extended
criminal jurisdiction over some civilians who commit acts outside of the
United States.95 Then, as part of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
Congress amended a provision of the United States Code defining the
Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ) of the United
States.9 6 This amendment expanded the definition of the SMTJ, but not
for offenses covered by MEJA.97 By expanding the definition of SMTJ
to include the premises of the U.S. military in foreign states, "the SMTJ
statute had the effect of narrowing the reach of the extraterritorial
criminal torture statute," which applies only to torture committed
"outside the United States." 98 At the same time, the expanded definition
of SMTJ did not correspond with expansion of the scope of federal
criminal law, including the prohibitions on assault and battery, to nonmilitary persons as applied under MEJA. As a result, starting from
October 26, 2001, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A no longer applied to
non-military actors in places such as the premises of U.S. military or
other U.S. government missions or entities in foreign states. 99 Congress
subsequently corrected this discrepancy as part of the National Defense
95. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 106-523, § 1, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2006)). The Act was primarily designed to criminalize acts
committed by people not governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice who accompany U.S.
Armed Forces outside of the United States. See Second Periodic Report of the United States of
America to the Committee Against Torture, Submitted to the Committee Against Torture (May 6,
2005), $ 43, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006)
[hereinafter Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee].
96. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), § 804, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272, 377 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2006)).
97. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95, $ 44 ("This paragraph [§
7(9)], however, does not apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in
section 3261(a) of Title 18, United States Code, which codifies the provision of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act described above.").
98. Id. T 46. The Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, at the time defined "the United States" by
reference to 18 U.S.C. § 7. Compare Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463
(1994), with Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, § 1089, 118 Stat. 1811, 2067 (2004).
99. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95, 77 44-46.
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20051"' by amending 18 U.S.C. §§
2340(3) to narrow the definition of the United States and thereby restore
the scope of the torture statute.1"' Therefore, between October 26, 2001
and October 28, 2004, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A arguably did not

regulate the actions of U.S. nationals who may have committed acts of
torture on the premises of U.S. military missions overseas. 0 2 Any
attempt to exploit this discrepancy, however, clearly runs contrary to
legislative intent, to the Torture Convention itself, which requires States
Parties to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction," and to jus cogens principles against torture recently
reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court."0 3
The second gap relates to the scope of Article 3's prohibition against

the expulsion, return ("refouler"), or extradition of a person to another
country where there is a likelihood of torture. Under U.S. law, torture

per se is not illegal within the United States, but the Senate indicated in
its advice and consent to the Convention that existing law prohibited all

acts of torture, including criminal prohibitions on assault, battery, and
100. Pub. L. No. 108-375.
101. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95, 46.
102. The Department of State, in its Second Periodic Report to the Committee Against
Torture, refers to this discrepancy as an "unintended legislative anomaly." Second U.S. Report to
45. It is unclear whether attorneys for the administration
Torture Committee, supra note 95,
were aware of the discrepancy when they gave advice to the CIA regarding the torture statute.
See, e.g., Bybee, supra note 71, at 174 n.2 (noting that the definition of the "United States" under
§ 2340 includes all places "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," including the SMTJ).
Bybee was not charged with addressing the meaning of the phrase "outside the United States"
within the context of the torture statute, and therefore he does not discuss the issue beyond this
footnote. Id. at 174. Other documents indicate a growing awareness of the discrepancy. See
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism, Mar. 6, 2003,
reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28, at 241, 244 & n. 10 (quoting relevant sections
of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) and § 7(1), and observing that "the Torture Statute does not apply to the
conduct of U.S. personnel at GTMO"). This Working Group Report concludes that the Torture
Statute "would apply to U.S. operations outside U.S. jurisdiction, such as Afghanistan." Id. at
245. A Working Group Report issued less than one month later does quote 18 U.S.C. § 7(9). See
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism, Apr. 4, 2003,
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28, at 286, 291 [hereinafter Working Group
Report]. The conclusion of this Working Group Report is more ambiguous: "Although Section
2340 does not apply to interrogations at GTMO, it could apply to U.S. operations outside U.S.
jurisdiction, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case involved." Id. at 292.
103. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 2(1); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 731-33 (2004). Additionally, the recent indictment of a CIA contractor alleged to have
beaten a prisoner to death in June 2003 at a U.S. detention facility in Afghanistan suggests that
this gap is not being exploited, because individuals can still be prosecuted for assault under the
expanded SMTJ jurisdiction, even if they technically cannot be prosecuted under the Torture
Statute. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95, 49.
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murder.1"4 Congress explicitly criminalized torture occurring outside of
the territory of the United States, but did not expressly extend the
obligations of Article 3 (nonrefoulement) to people subject to transfer

from U.S. custody when not present in U.S. territory. °5 In fact, FARRA
expressly bars jurisdiction for consideration of any determinations made
pursuant to the explicit policy prohibiting involuntary return regardless

of whether a person is physically present in the United States.'0 6
Ignoring precedents which minimize the effect of such prohibitions,0 7
some courts have held that FARRA does not extend legal rights beyond
the removal setting, 108 including cases alleging fear of extraordinary

rendition.'09
A recent study by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
suggests that this gap in statutory coverage may in part result from the
language of Article 3 of the Torture Convention itself:

[I]t could be argued that the provisions of... Article 3 do not
apply to extraordinary renditions occurring outside the United
104. See Convention Against Torture: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 101st
Cong. 5 (1990) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Department of State Legal Adviser) ("We do
agree that there is no need for the legal protections of the convention against torture in the United
States. Existing U.S. law makes any act falling within the convention's definition of torture a
criminal offense as well as a violation of various civil statutes.").
105. See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 15, at 94 ("[N]either the regulations governing extradition
nor those governing removal proceedings under FARRA are designed to apply to persons being
transferred by, or with the complicity of, U.S. actors outside the United States to third states.").
106. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242(d) ("Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, and except as provided in the regulations described in subsection (b),
no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to implement this section....").
107. See DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
IN A NUTSHELL 311-12 (5th ed. 2005) (noting that courts narrowly construe such purported bars
to jurisdiction).
108. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004), motion grantedfor
rehearing en banc 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded with instructions to
dismiss as moot 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004) ("While § 2242(d) plainly contemplates judicial
review of final orders of removal for compliance with the Torture Convention and the FARR Act,
it just as plainly does not contemplate judicial review for anything else."). The precedential value
of this decision is nil. See Cornejo-Barreto, 386 F.3d at 938 ("The three-judge panel opinion shall
not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit."); Ridley v.
McCall, 496 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a decision subsequently vacated,
remanded, and found to be moot had no precedential value); cf O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 577 n.12 (1975) (observing that a Supreme Court decision vacating an appeals court
judgment deprives the appeals court judgment of precedential effect). Nonetheless, the opinion
has been cited favorably by at least one other court. See O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 118
n.17 (D.D.C. 2005).
109. O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 118 n.17 ("FARRA is quite explicit that no legal rights can be
derived from its rules outside of the removal setting, by analogy or otherwise.").
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States. Article 3 states that no party shall "expel, return

('refouler') or extradite a person" to a country where there are
substantial grounds to believe that he will be tortured. It could be

argued, however, that extraterritorial, irregular renditions are not
covered by this provision. Seizing a person in one country and
transferring him to another would arguably not constitute
"expelling" the suspect. So long as these persons were rendered
to countries where they had not previously resided, it also could

not be said that the United States "returned" these persons to
countries where they faced torture. In addition, if such renditions
were not executed via an extradition agreement, it could be

argued they did not constitute extraditions for the purposes of
Article 3.11
Such arguments demonstrate an attempt to defeat the purpose of the

Convention, and potentially run afoul of the non-derogability provision
in Article 2(2).I1i Guidance from the Committee Against Torture and the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees suggests that the nonrefoulement obligation extends more broadly to include at least some
forms of indirect transfer." 2
110. GARCIA, supra note 92, at 18; see So, What's All the Fuss?, supra note 80 (positing that
the administration is not applying the "substantial grounds" standard to extraterritorial transfers).
But see Press Release, Office of Press Sec'y, President Meets with World Health Organization
Director-General (Dec. 6, 2005) (Statement of George W. Bush, President of the United States),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051206-1.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006)
("We do not render to countries that torture."). For further articulation of these arguments, see
John Yoo, TransferringTerrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1229-31 (2004) (arguing that
Article 3 does not apply to extraterritorial transfers).
111. See GARCIA, supra note 92, at 18. Additionally, many people are transferred to their
country of birth through extraordinary rendition, which would seem to be in violation of the
prohibition on "return," at least as the Congressional Research Service interprets the term. For the
purposes of the Refugee Convention and Protocol, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
prohibition on return (refouler) to mean that an individual is only entitled to a determination of
refugee status (and therefore subject to the protection against refoulement) when the person has
arrived at the shores of the United States. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 186
(1993). This decision has been sharply criticized as undermining the intent and purpose of the
Convention and Protocol. See, e.g., Harold Honju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian
Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-17 (1994).
112. See Motumbo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/44, at 45
(1994) (holding that the principle of nonrefoulement prohibits return of persons to third countries
in which they run a real risk of being returned to a country where they would be in danger of
being subjected to torture); Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme,
Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Who Move in an IrregularMannerfrom a Country in
Which They Had Already Found Protection, Conclusion No. 58 (XL) (1989) (indicating that if an
asylum-seeker leaves a safe asylum country, he or she may be returned there under certain
conditions); see also Suzanne Gluck, Note, Intercepting Refugees at Sea: An Analysis of the
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The CRS report read Article 4 in combination with the 2001
amendments to the Torture Statute. Article 4 calls on States Parties to
criminalize all acts of torture, including complicity in torture." 3 The
2001 amendments to the Torture Statute added criminal penalties for
conspiracy to commit torture outside of the United States. 114 The CRS
report concluded that "U.S. officials could not conspire with foreign
intelligence services to torture persons seized outside of the United
States.""' Nonetheless, the express language of FARRA precludes an
individual from "raising a claim" under the Convention unless it is
pursuant to a final order for removal. To that extent, a gap might remain
in the scope of the Torture Convention's potential applicability under
U.S. law. As argued below, traditional tools of interpretation provide
clear guidance to close this purported gap.

United States'Legaland Moral Obligations, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 888 (1993) (noting that

the High Commissioner has interpreted the nonrefoulement obligation to include the requirement
that asylum-seekers be allowed to present a request to competent authorities and that the request
must be examined prior to return); cf Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A),

91 (1989) (holding that Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, is implicated when there is a real risk that a
person will be subjected to such treatment or punishment upon return); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.
Supp. 389, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Soering constitutes an important precedent on the refusal to
extradite because of anticipated torture, cruel conditions of incarceration or lack of due process at
trial in the requesting country. It reflects a persuasive though non-binding international
standard."). The Soering case is particularly instructive with regard to the U.S. judicial system's
relationship with other human rights bodies. Jens Soering was a German national subject to
extradition to Virginia, where the prosecutor had stated he would seek the death penalty.
Applying a two-part test, the European Court of Human Rights determined that there was a real
risk that Soering would be sentenced to death, and then found that there was a real risk Soering
would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment on death row. After the decision, the
Virginia prosecutor amended the charges to avoid the death penalty and Soering was extradited.
For a discussion of Soering, see DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 642-43 (3d ed. 2001). The same
grounds would arguably apply to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United
States has ratified.
113. Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 4.
114. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
811(g), 115 Stat. 272, 381 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(c) (2006)).
115. GARCIA, supra note 92, at 19. Professor Yoo contends that U.S. officials participating in
extraterritorial transfers could violate the Torture Statute, but not "so long as the individuals
ultimately ordering a transfer do not intend for a detainee to be tortured post-transfer...." Yoo,
supra note 110, at 1233. This proposition is overly narrow and runs contrary to the nonderogability principle embodied in the Convention. See also infra notes 153-158 and
accompanying text (describing the requisite intent for conspiracy).
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ExtraordinaryRendition Constitutes a Criminal Conspiracy to
Commit Torture

The drafting history of the Torture Convention" 6 and decisions of the
Committee Against Torture" 7 can guide U.S. courts in ascertaining
whether extraordinary rendition violates U.S. obligations under the
Convention, as codified by U.S. law." 8
The drafters of the Torture Convention devoted considerable debate
to Article 3.119 Article 3 prohibits expulsion, return (refoulement) and

extradition to torture, but the prohibition does not directly apply to the
lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in
Article 16.120 The drafters considered a more expansive version of
Article 3 that would have included cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment, but ultimately did not embrace the proposal.'
During the Convention drafting process, participants debated the

relationship between Article 3 and pre-existing extradition treaties,
which could be incompatible with the obligations imposed on States
Parties by the prohibition of extradition to torture. 2 The negotiators
recognized that a State Party may make a valid reservation or

declaration upon ratification of the Convention that it did not "consider
116. See generally J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988) (providing the
drafting history of the Convention).

117. The Committee Against Torture was established in Articles 17-24 of the Convention
Against Torture. As is its prerogative under the Convention, the United States does not recognize

the competence of the Committee to investigate complaints by individuals claiming to be victims
of U.S. violations of the Convention. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note
95, 90.
118. This history and jurisprudence are also relevant, of course, for other judicial bodies
which, pursuant to Article 5, may have cause to evaluate U.S. practices. Article 5 requires States
Parties to establish jurisdiction over acts of torture when the acts take place in their jurisdiction
and when the alleged offender is present in any territory under their jurisdiction. See Convention
Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 5. Article 5 also allows States Parties to take similar measures
when the victim is a national of their state. Id. Additionally, if a State Party is the country where
the extraordinary rendition begins, and the State Party assists or allows the extraordinary
rendition to take place, that State Party may be in violation of Article 3. Id., art. 3. Hence, States

Parties may be obligated to take measures against U.S. participation in extraordinary rendition
resulting from U.S. "complicity" in torture in violation of Article 4. The scope of Article 4, it
should be noted, is not limited to the jurisdiction of the State Party.
119. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 116, at 31-113.

120. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 16 ("In particular, the obligations
contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of
reference to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
121. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 116, at 150.
122. See id. at 125-28.
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itself bound by Article 3" if the article was incompatible with preexisting extradition treaties with countries not parties to the Torture
Convention.1 3 With this potential conflict in mind, President Reagan's
transmittal letter to the Senate included a recommended reservation that
would "eliminate the possibility of conflicting treaty obligations" by
stating that the United States did not consider itself bound by Article 3
when the article's obligations conflict with bilateral extradition
treaties.1 4 The Senate, however, did not include that reservation in its
advice and consent to ratification.' 25 Accordingly, it is reasonable to
conclude that the United States deemed it entirely possible to comply
both with Article 3 and with extradition treaties. Therefore, any alleged
conflict between the two would not justify the practice of extraordinary
rendition. The fact that FARRA requires extraditions from U.S. territory
to follow specific procedures and affords the Secretary of State
discretion to decide that extradition would violate Article 3 also
supports the conclusion that the State Department must have at least a
minimal level of oversight over all transfers.' 26
The Convention history demonstrates that the drafters intended
Article 3 to have extraterritorial effect. For example, although the
drafters modeled the article after Article 33 of the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, they intended Article 3 to be broader in
scope.' 27 The prohibition in Article 3 originally referred only to
expulsion and extradition, but the drafters ultimately added reference to
"return ('refoulement')" "in order to make the provision more
complete.... As it now reads, the article is intended to cover all
measures by which a person is physically transferred to another state."' 25
President Reagan, in his transmittal document, attempted to limit U.S.
responsibility to comply with Article 3. He recommended a declaration

123. See id. at 127.
124. Torture Convention Transmittal Document, supra note 70, at 24.
125. See 136 CONG. REC. S17486, S17491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
126. See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 15, at 45-48. Also relevant to an analysis of domestic
compliance with the Convention Against Torture is the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
which was enacted prior to Senate advice and consent to the Torture Convention, and allows U.S.
citizens to bring civil actions seeking damages for torture committed against them by individuals
acting under authority of foreign nations. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). Discussion of the Torture
Victim Protection Act is beyond the scope of this Article.
127. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S 67 (incorporating arts. 2-34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 1954); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra
note 116, at 125.
128. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 116, at 126.
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to specify that the "competent authorities" responsible for "tak[ing] into
account all relevant considerations" in determining whether there are
substantial grounds to believe that an individual would be in danger of
being subjected to torture are limited to "the Secretary of State in
extradition cases and to the Attorney General in deportation cases." ' 29
The Senate rejected this declaration. 3 ° In addition, the United States
entered no reservations, declarations, or understandings with respect to
Article 4, which requires States Parties to criminalize complicity in
torture, or to Article 2(2), which emphasizes that torture may never be
justified. A broad interpretation of Article 3 is therefore consistent with
Convention history and Senate consideration of proposed declarations.
The Presidential transmittal document even emphasized with respect to
Article 5 the importance to the United States of establishing universal
jurisdiction to punish persons responsible for torture: "The United
States strongly supported the provision for universal jurisdiction, on the
grounds that torture, like hijacking, sabotage, hostage-taking, and
attacks on internationally protected persons, is an offense of special
international concern, and should have similarly broad, universal
recognition as a crime against humanity, with appropriate jurisdictional
consequences.'' In this context, it seems reasonable to conclude that
neither the framers of the Torture Convention nor the U.S. government
at the time of ratification intended to allow government officials to
escape responsibility for torture by seizing individuals in a foreign
country and then delivering them to a third country where they would be
subjected to torture. The first U.S. report to the Committee Against
Torture, submitted by the Clinton administration, also emphasized:
No official of the Government, federal, state or local, civilian or
military, is authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to
commit torture. Nor may any official condone or tolerate torture
in any form. No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a
justification of torture. United States law contains no provision
permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be employed
on grounds of exigent circumstances (for example, during a
"state of public emergency") or on orders from a superior officer
or public authority, and the protective mechanisms of an
129.
Against
130.
131.

See Torture Convention Transmittal Document, supra note 70, at 26; Convention
Torture, supra note 57, art. 3(2)
See 136 CONG. REc. S17486, S17491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
Torture Convention Transmittal Document, supra note 70, at 31.
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independent judiciary are not subject to suspension. The United
States is committed to the full and effective implementation
of its
132
territory.
its
throughout
Convention
the
under
obligations
Even the second U.S. report to the Committee Against Torture,
submitted by the Bush administration, while less definitive in its
embrace of the Convention's non-derogability provision,"' noticeably
avoids discussion of rendition, except possibly with regard to the
transfer of Guantdtnamo detainees to their home countries. 34 The
absence of any attempt to address allegations of rendition to torture
suggests that the administration understands that such attempts would
violate U.S. responsibilities under Article 3.135 The practice of
132. First U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 81, 6.
133. The non-derogability language in the second report is more restrained:
The United States is unequivocally opposed to the use and practice of torture. No
circumstance whatsoever, including war, the threat of war, internal political instability,
public emergency, or an order from a superior officer or public authority, may be
invoked as a justification for or defense to commit torture....
All components of the United States Government are obligated to act in compliance
with the law, including all United States constitutional, statutory, and treaty obligations
relating to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The U.S.
government does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture, or other unlawful practice, by
its personnel or employees under any circumstances. U.S. laws prohibiting such
practices apply both when the employees are operating in the United States and in other
parts of the world.
Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95,
3-4. Removed from the Second
Report is the following language: "Nor may any official condone or tolerate torture in any form."
See First U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 81, 6; supra text accompanying note 81.
Instead, the report revises that language with a qualification of particular relevance to
extraordinary rendition: "The U.S. government does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture, or
other unlawful practice, by its personnel or employees under any circumstances." Second Report,
supra note 95,
4 (emphasis added); see also Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Press
Availability with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rmI/2005/57723.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) ("[T]he CAT.. .prohibits... cruel and
inhumane and degrading treatment, [and] those obligations extend to U.S. personnel wherever
they are....").
134. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95,
27-40. The report does
include a general statement that "The United States does not transfer persons to countries where
the United States believes it is 'more likely than not' that they will be tortured." Second U.S.
Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95, 27. The report limits its discussion, however, to
Article 3 in the removal context, id.
28-35, and in the extradition context, id.
36-40.
Beyond this discussion, the only relevant information relating to Article 3 compliance is found in
a tab to an annex detailing treatment of individuals under the control of U.S. Armed Forces. See
id., Annex I, tab 1. The tab consists of two hyperlinks to declarations of State Department
officials regarding the legal process whereby Guantinamo detainees are sent to their home
countries. Id.
135. The report deals at great length with allegations of torture committed by U.S. Armed
Forces and even the CIA, and explains that allegations are being investigated and violators are
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extraordinary rendition also suggests that the United States is violating

its obligation under customary international
law to perform its
13 6
Convention obligations in good faith.
The Committee Against Torture has published two findings relevant

to the U.S. practice of extraordinary rendition. First, in Khan v.
Canada,'37 the Committee noted that sending a person to a country not a
party to the Torture Convention would subject a person to a risk of

torture, and also would strip the person of any possibility of applying
for protection under the Convention.'38 This consideration is important,
because the press has reported that the United States has transferred

individuals to Syria, which was not a party to the Torture Convention
until September 2004.'
Agiza v. Sweden, 4 ° the second relevant Committee Against Torture

decision, directly implicates the U.S. practice of extraordinary rendition.
Ahmed Agiza, an Egyptian national, left Egypt in 1991, and sought
being punished. See Second U.S. Report to Torture Committee, supra note 95, 16; id., Annex 1.
The government's failure to establish an impartial body to conduct the investigations undermines
its credibility. See, e.g., Michael Kirkland, It's Time to Come Clean, UPI, June 16, 2004. Article
12 of the Convention Against Torture requires each State Party to "ensure that its competent
authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground
to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction."
Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 12. This obligation to conduct a prompt and
impartial investigation presumably extends even to allegations of extraordinary rendition. See
also infra notes 271-274 and accompanying text (noting that the current CIA torture investigation
does not extend to the practice of extraordinary rendition).
136. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321 (1987); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW QC,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 811-12 (5th ed. 2003) ("This rule is termed pacta sunt servanda and is
arguably the oldest principle of international law.").
137. Communication No. 15/1994, Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. A/50/44, at 46
(1994).
138. Id. 12.5.
139. See Treaty Body Database, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Treaty Body Database], Syrian Arab Republic,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset (last visited Apr. 20, 2006); N.Y. City Bar, supra
note 15, at 71; see also Brown & Priest, supra note 6 (reporting that Syria "maintains a secret but
growing intelligence relationship with the CIA"). While not technically a case of extraordinary
rendition for the purposes of this Article, in 2002 the United States detained Maher Arar while
Arar was transferring airplanes at JFK International Airport, and subsequently sent Arar to Syria,
where he was tortured. See id.; Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar, available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/ index.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2006). The Gambia is not a State Party to the Convention, see Treaty Body Database,
supra, Gambia, and has also been used by the CIA for rendition, see Grey, Torture Flights, supra
note 20; Grey, Gulag, supra note 6.
140. Communication No. 233/2003, May 20, 2005, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003
[hereinafter Agiza].
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asylum in Sweden in 2000. In the meantime, Egyptian authorities tried
him in absentia for terrorist activity, and sentenced him to twenty-five
years' imprisonment. On December 18, 2001, the Swedish government
rejected his asylum application, and ordered his immediate
deportation. 41 Under pressure from the U.S. government, Swedish
police apprehended Agiza that same day, and then handed him over to
U.S. security personnel

at the Bromma

airport. 142 U.S.

security

personnel then subjected Agiza to "treatment in breach of, at least,
Article 16 of the Convention," and took him to Egypt.143 The United
44
States provided transportation in an effort to expedite the deportation.
The Committee Against Torture held that:
[I]t was known, or should have been known, to [Sweden]'s
authorities at the time of complainant's removal that Egypt
resorted to consistent and widespread use of torture against
detainees, and that the risk of such treatment was particularly
high in the case of detainees held for political and security
reasons. 145

The Committee interpreted the harsh treatment of Agiza by U.S.
agents at the airport as confirmation of "the natural conclusion" that
Agiza was "at a real risk of torture in Egypt in the event of expulsion,"
and therefore
Sweden had breached Article 3 of the Convention Against
46
Torture. 1

141. Id. 2.2-2.5.
142. See id. 9 12.28-29; Craig Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects; 2 Men
Reportedly Tortured in Egypt, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at Al. Apparently, the Swedish
government made efforts to keep the CIA role secret for three years, and only confirmed direct
CIA involvement in March 2005. See Swedish Government Investigator Condemns CIA
Treatment of Prisoners, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, May 21, 2005 [hereinafter PRESS TRUST].
Several Swedish witnesses to the operation described the U.S. behavior as "professional"indicating that this was not the first time they had participated in a rendition. See, e.g., id.; Craig
Whitlock, New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action: Probe Finds 'Rendition' of Terror
Suspects Illegal, WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Whitlock, Swedish Documents];
see also Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,
2005, at Al [hereinafter Priest, Mistake] (describing the standard procedures of the
Counterterrorist Center's Rendition Group at the CIA).
143. Agiza, supra note 140, 9 13.4.
144. See Whitlock, Swedish Documents, supra note 142.
145. Agiza, supra note 140, 13.4.
146. Id. $$ 13.4, 14. Tomas Hammarberg, a former Swedish diplomat who pressed for an
investigation of the rendition, noted, "American security agents just took over." He continued,
"We know they were badly treated on the spot, that scissors and knives were used to take off their
clothes. And they were shackled. And some tranquilizers were [inserted rectally], obviously in
order to make them dizzy and fall asleep." CBS News, supra note 36. Mamdouh Habib's rendition
from Pakistan to Egypt follows a similar pattern. See Mayer, supra note 16.
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The Committee harshly criticized the lack of opportunity to review
the decision to expel Agiza:
The Committee's previous jurisprudence has been consistent
with this view of the requirements of article 3, having found an
inability to contest an expulsion decision before an independent
authority.. .to be relevant to a finding of a violation of article
3....
In the present case.. .there was no possibility for review of
any kind of this decision. The Committee recalls that the
Convention's protections are absolute, even in the context of
national security concerns, and that such considerations
emphasize the importance of appropriate review mechanisms.
While national security concerns might justify some adjustments
to be made to the particular process of review, the mechanism
chosen must continue to satisfy article 3's requirements of
effective,
independent
and impartial review....
[T]he
Government's decision to expel the complainant does not meet
the procedural obligation to provide for effective, independent
and impartial review required by article 3 of the Convention. 47
This discussion implicates a fortiori the lack of any oversight or
review of U.S. decisions to engage in extraordinary rendition, because
those decisions themselves are made by CIA and military officials who
cannot ordinarily be held publicly accountable for such covert
activities. 4 Additionally, by pressing for and facilitating Agiza's
expedited removal within hours of the decision to deport him, the
United States was complicit in the Swedish government's failure to
meet its procedural obligations under Article 3.
Agiza has probably been tortured while in Egyptian custody, and he
remains in an Egyptian prison.149 The Committee's decision in Agiza
provides several lessons to inform application of Article 3 to U.S.
rendition policy. First, extraditing a terror suspect to Egypt is inherently
suspect, and suspicions cannot be alleviated by obtaining assurances
147. Agiza, supra note 140,
13.7-13.8. Agiza's attorney did not receive notice of his
departure until the day after Agiza's deportation. See Whitlock, Swedish Documents, supra note
142.
148. Sweden has scheduled open parliamentary hearings on the rendition. See PRESS TRUST,
supra note 142. The director of Sweden's security police has promised never again to let foreign
agents take charge of such a case. See Whitlock, EuropeansInvestigate,supra note 19.
149. See Agiza, supra note 140, 3.4; Whitlock, EuropeansInvestigate, supra note 19.
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from the Egyptian government.15 ° Second, Article 3 obliges
governments to provide persons with an effective, independent, and
impartial review of extradition decisions. Third, the "professional"
practices used by CIA agents during rendition themselves constitute
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and constitute evidence that the
detainee will subsequently be subjected to torture. Most important, the
rendition of Agiza from Sweden to Egypt, which the Committee
Against Torture found to violate Article 3, happened with the support
and assistance of the United States.
A report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment indicates that extraordinary rendition
undermines the principle of nonrefoulement:
The Special Rapporteur is seriously concerned about an increase
in practices that undermine th[e] principle [of nonrefoulement].
One such practice is for the police authorities of one country to
hand over persons to their counterparts in other countries without
the intervention of a judicial authority and without any
possibility for the persons concerned to contact their families or
their lawyers. The Committee against Torture... found that
practice to be in violation of article 3 of the Convention, as well
as of the right to due process. 1 '
This statement confirms that the practice of extraordinary rendition
contravenes Article 3 of the Torture Convention.
In most instances extraordinary rendition also constitutes a criminal
conspiracy to commit torture in violation of the Torture Statute. The
general federal conspiracy statute provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.'52

150. Agiza, supra note 140, 1 13.4.
151. Theo van Boven, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Aug. 23, 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/324, 29.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). The phrase "offense against the United States" does not require
that the United States be the victim of the offense. United States v. Falcone, 960 F.2d 988, 990

(1 th Cir. 1992).
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of conspiracy,

which must be proven by the

government beyond a reasonable doubt, are: "1)that two or more people
agreed to pursue an unlawful objective; 2) that the defendant voluntarily
agreed to join the conspiracy; and 3) that one or more members of the
1' 53
conspiracy committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy."
The second and third elements are not in dispute; the United States
participates voluntarily in extraordinary rendition, and providing
personnel and transportation certainly constitutes an overt act. The focus
properly rests on the first element. Criminal conspiracy requires the
existence of an agreement to commit an unlawful act.' 54 The agreement
does not need to be express or formal; 155 a tacit understanding is
sufficient.'56 Additionally, the agreement may be inferred from the
circumstances.'5 7 To avoid criminal liability, a defendant must complete

his or her attempt to abandon the conspiracy, and must make the attempt
to abandon in good faith. 58

Circumstantial evidence demonstrates the existence of a conspiracy
to torture terror suspects by means of extraordinary rendition. Legal
memoranda for the CIA advise that if officials are contemplating
procedures that may constitute violations of U.S. law, "they will not be
responsible if it can be argued that the detainees are formally in the
custody of another country."' 159 Looking beyond this superficial
formality, the CIA does retain control: the CIA expects governments
accepting the prisoners to comply with CIA requests 6 ° and the CIA
153. United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432-33 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Dien
Duc Huynh, 246 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2001)).
154. See United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003).
155. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); United States v.
Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1997).
156. See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943) (holding that evidence
of prolonged cooperation and a stake in the venture may constitute sufficient evidence of
conspiracy).
157. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
158. See Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 71, 81 (7th Cir. 1936).
159. James Risen et al., Harsh CIA Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations,N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2004, at Al.
160. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 17 ("When asked if the men would be released if
the U.S. requested it, [the Yemeni Undersecretary of the Central Organ for Political Security]
said, without hesitation, 'yes."'); Jehl, supra note 20 (noting that Pentagon officials assert that
their transfers do not qualify as "renditions," "because the governments that accept the prisoners
are not expected to carry out the will of the United States"). Presumably, therefore, governments
accepting prisoners in the CIA rendition program are expected to carry out the will of the United
States. This distinction was reiterated in two rulings in the District Court for the District of
Columbia when petitioners applied for injunctive relief to require 30 days' notice before transfer
out of Guantdnamo. See Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2005);
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collaborates with receiving authorities during interrogation.' 61 Many
officials directly involved in the program have recognized that
transferred suspects were likely to be tortured. Several officials
suggested that the administration was "turning a blind eye" to this
likelihood.'62 Other statements by officials have gone even further,
indicating that the purpose of rendition is to subject suspects to
treatment that the CIA cannot legally use.' 63 Additional evidence comes
from the extensive legal documents drafted at the request of the CIA,
which narrowly construe the statutory definition of torture.'64 This
evidence suggests a CIA effort to evade or at least push the legal limits
of treatment of detainees during interrogations. Additional
circumstantial evidence indicates that the administration sought to carve
out exceptions to overall policies of humane treatment, in deference to
CIA attorneys.'65 Also, slight changes in the U.S. submissions to the
Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp. 2d 72, 79 (D.D.C. 2005). Other judges hearing similar cases
have not been so trusting. See infra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
161. See United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 339, 343 (E.D. Va. 2005) (reporting that
in Saudi Arabia U.S. officials provided questions to Saudi interrogators and observed live
interrogations through a two-way mirror); Mayer, supra note 16 (reporting that CIA officials
would give Egyptian interrogators a list of questions in the morning, and receive a list of answers
the same evening); O'Sullivan, supra note 22 ("[T]he CIA had technical personnel 'virtually
embedded' at [Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate] headquarters."); Priest & Gellman,
supra note 19 (noting that the CIA gives intelligence services in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco lists
of questions it wants answered when it hands suspects over to authorities in those countries);
Priest & Stephens, supra note 39 ("[Terror suspects'] fate [when detained in Saudi Arabia] is
largely controlled by Saudi-based joint intelligence task forces, whose members include officers
from the CIA, FBI and other U.S. law enforcement agencies."); infra note 260 (describing
unrefuted evidence of U.S.-Saudi collaboration in the case of Abu Ali v. Ashcroft). But see Abu
Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 381-83 (rejecting the allegation that U.S. and Saudi officials were engaged
in a "joint venture" in arresting, detaining, and interrogating the defendant).
162. See supra note 38.
163. See Michael Isikoff, Secret Memo-Send to Be Tortured,NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at 7
(reporting that an FBI agent's memo drafted in 2002 concluded that because the purpose of
extraordinary rendition is to use interrogation techniques that violate U.S. law, the program "is a
per se violation of the U.S. Torture Statute"); supra note 38.
164. See Bybee, supra note 71; Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold; Memo on
Methods of Interrogation Had Wide Review, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at Al [hereinafter
Priest, Harsh Tactics]. But see Arbour, supra note 14 ("An illegal interrogation technique
... remains illegal whatever new description a government might wish to give it.").
165. See, e.g., Gonzales Nomination Hearing, supra note 41 (statement of Attorney General
nominee Alberto Gonzales) ("It has always been the case that everyone should be treated-that
the military would treat detainees humanely, consistent with the [P]resident's February order.");
Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833, §§ l(a), 2(a), 3(b) (Nov. 13, 2001) (requiring that individuals subject to the order be
"treated humanely" while detained by the Department of Defense, but providing that an
individual is only subject to the order if "it is in the interest of the United States"); George W.
Bush, Memorandum for the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
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Committee Against Torture from 1999 to 2005 suggest that the
administration was attempting to limit its rejection of torture to those
acts committed directly by U.S. personnel. 66 Further, the United States
has received direct evidence that people it has transferred have been
subjected to torture, and yet the government persists in pursuing the
program, oftentimes to the same countries that have tortured transferred
suspects in the past.'67
D.

Defenses of ExtraordinaryRendition Are Inadequate

Extraordinary rendition cannot be justified on policy grounds. U.S.
authorities claim that cultural affinities, rather than torture, facilitate
interrogation, but it is likely that the United States is able to train or hire
Detainees, Feb. 7, 2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28, 134, 135 ("As a
matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely....");
Status of Legal Discussions re Application of Geneva Convention to Taliban and al Qaeda,
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 28, 130, 132 (quoting an unsigned record of a
discussion among administration lawyers, "CIA lawyers believe that, to the extent that GPW's
protections do not apply as a matter of law but those protections are applied as a matter of policy,
it is desirable to circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA. The other
lawyers involved did not disagree with or object to CIA's view."); Feldman, supra note 50
(observing that the memoranda focus on the Torture Statute because CIA is not bound by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice); Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees out of Iraq;
PracticeIs Called Serious Breach of Geneva Conventions, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at AI
(noting that the CIA had requested the Goldsmith memorandum of March 2004) [hereinafter
Priest, Memo]; Marty Lederman, Understanding the OLC Torture Memos (Part II), Balkinization,
Jan. 7, 2005, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/understanding-olc-torture-memos-part.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2006) ("All of this is [fairly] strong evidence that the Administration has gone to
significant lengths to preserve a significant CIA loophole."). Lederman was an attorney-advisor at
the Office of Legal Counsel from 1994-2002. See Marty Lederman, Understanding the OLC
Torture Memos (Part I), Balkinization, Jan. 7, 2005, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/
understanding-olc-torture-memos-part-i.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Lederman,
Part II.
166. See supra note 133.
167. See, e.g., Detainees: HearingBefore the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,supra note
36 (testimony of Joseph Margulies, attorney for Mamdouh Habib, describing Australian
Mamdouh Habib's rendition by U.S. agents from Pakistan to Egypt, subsequent transfer to
Guantfnamo, and testimony at a Guantdnamo hearing that all evidence of his terrorist affiliations
was produced as a result of torture in Egypt); Van Natta, Recruits, supra note 23 (reporting that
intelligence officials estimate that dozens of suspects have been sent to Uzbekistan, and that
during 2003 and 2004, CIA flights arrived in Tashkent twice a week); Judge Says Agents of West
Took Egyptian, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A13 (noting that in May 2005 Egyptian Prime
Minister Ahmed Nazief said that the United States had transferred up to 70 terror suspects to
Egypt via rendition, but asserted that none had been tortured in interrogations); CBS News, supra
note 36 (quoting former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig Murray that the Uzbek
authorities are using "torture techniques straight out of the Middle Ages" and that "[t]he CIA
definitely knows. I asked my deputy to go and speak to the CIA, and she came back and reported
to me that.. .the CIA head of station.. didn't see that as a problem.").
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suitable interrogators. Also, professional intelligence procedures place
heavy emphasis on maintaining control of the people subject to
interrogation.' 68 In addition, the need for secrecy does not justify
extraordinary rendition; a person can be brought to the United States to
stand trial without following traditional extradition procedures that
might bring unwanted attention. Media reports demonstrate that
extraordinary rendition is also not an effective cost-saving measure.' 69
Administration assertions that renditions are vital to the nation's defense
simply support the conclusion that the United States has a vested stake
in the "venture" of extraordinary rendition, and therefore is motivated to
conspire to commit torture.
The administration argues that it obtains diplomatic assurances that
people will not be tortured when they are transferred. Professor John
Yoo contends that seeking diplomatic assurances from the receiving
country is a sufficient defense to charges that the United States is
conspiring to commit torture:
Because an agreement, explicit or implicit, is a necessary
element of a conspiracy, to avoid liability under the statute U.S.
officials would need to ensure only that they did not in any way
agree to or encourage the torturing of military detainees. The
actual securing of assurances from other countries that
transferred detainees will not be tortured is a significantly greater
step than domestic law requires. 170
Yoo notes that "if adhered to such an 'agreement avoidance' policy
would be sufficient to insulate U.S. officials from potential criminal
liability."''
In light of the absence of any defensible justification for
extraordinary renditions, such assurances seem to be sought not in good
faith, but rather as a "legal nicety" to skirt criminal liability.'
The

168. See Gerecht, CIA, supra note 55.
169. See, e.g., Italians Issue Warrantfor CIA Snatch Team, UPI, June 24, 2005 (reporting
that the hotel and car rental charges for the rendition of Hassan Mustafa Osam Nasr from Italy
amounted to over $140,000).
170. Yoo, supra note 110, at 1235.
171. Id. at 1235 n.220.
172. Scheuer, supra note 17; see also ABC Radio: Report Paints Disturbing Picture of
Transfer of Islamic Militants (ABC Australian radio broadcast May 11, 2005) (statement of
Human Rights Watch Deputy Director Joe Stork) ("If you need to ask them to promise not to
torture, then that's a country you shouldn't be sending them to in the first place."); cf supra note
158 and accompanying text (noting that, to be valid, a co-conspirator's renunciation of a
conspiracy must be made in good faith). For a thorough report on the administration's flawed
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Committee Against Torture in Agiza rejected the use of diplomatic
assurances to guard against an otherwise evident risk of torture under
Article 3, and noted that due to the existence of the assurances, the
Swedish official in Egypt responsible for monitoring compliance with
the assurances concealed evidence of torture in his reports. 7 3 Likewise,
the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

has stated that "post-return monitoring mechanisms do little to mitigate
the risk of torture and have proven ineffective in both safeguarding
' Assurances are
against torture and as a mechanism of accountability."174

highly suspect under circumstances when official State Department
country reports confirm that the state uses or abides by torture
frequently or systematically,175 that the state employs torture as an

interrogation technique, 7 6 that torture is particularly common for people
suspected of participation in terrorism, extremism, or other political

reliance on assurances, see Julia Hall, Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No SafeguardAgainst
Torntre, 17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 4 (2005), availableat http://hrw.org/reports/2005/ecaO405/eca

0405.pdf.
173. See Agiza, supra note 140,
4.24, 8.1, 12.15, 13.10; id. 13.4 ("The procurement of
diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not
suffice to protect against this manifest risk.").
174. The Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 46, Submitted to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/60/316 (Aug. 30, 2005).
175. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,

EGYPT (2004) [hereinafter Egypt Country Report] (noting that "torture and abuse of
detainees.. .remained common and persistent"); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, JORDAN (2004) [hereinafter Jordan Country Report] (reporting a
"climate of impunity" regarding allegations of torture); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, MOROCCO (2004) [hereinafter Morocco Country
Report] (citing an Amnesty International report which found "systematic torture and ill
treatment" of detainees); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, SAUDI ARABIA (2004) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Country Report] (reporting abuse of
detainees); Syria Country Report, supra note 30 (citing "credible evidence" that torture is used
"frequently," sometimes resulting in death); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, UZBEKISTAN (2004) [hereinafter Uzbekistan Country Report]
(noting that torture is "common" and "systematic"). See generally Commission on Human Rights,
Sub-Comm. On Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Transfer of Persons, 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/L. 12 (Aug. 4, 2005) ("[W]here torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment is widespread or systematic in a particular State.. .there is a presumption that any
person subject to transfer would face a real risk of being subjected to such treatment and.. .the
presumption shall not be displaced by any assurance.").
176. See, e.g., Egypt Country Report, supra note 175; Morocco Country Report, supra note
175; Saudi Arabia Country Report, supra note 175; Syria Country Report, supra note 30;
Uzbekistan Country Report, supra note 175.
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activities,' 77 and that those governments demonstrate a pattern of
denying the existence of torture in their countries.'7 8 Under such
conditions, assurances create an incentive not to monitor and enforce
compliance, resulting in a system called "don't ask, don't tell" by one
Arab diplomat whose country has participated in renditions.'79
Assurances, instead of providing a defense to the agreement element
of a conspiracy charge, may constitute additional evidence of the
administration's attempt to shield itself from criminal liability for a
program that it asserts is vital to our nation's defense. CIA agents and
other officials involved with rendition suggest that assurances constitute
a bad-faith attempt to avoid an impression of conspiracy. One official
said, "You would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe that the
Syrians were not going to use torture, even if they are making claims to
the contrary."' 8 ° Another said, "They say they are not abusing them, and
that satisfies the legal requirement, but we all know they do."'' Others
called the assurance system "a farce" and said it "has been ineffective
177. See, e.g., Egypt Country Report, supra note 175 (noting that torture is used to "coerce
opposition figures to cease their political activities, and to deter others from similar practices");
Jordan Country Report, supra note 175 (observing that people alleged to be affiliated with Abu
Musab al Zarqawi claimed that they had been subjected to torture and that their confessions had
been obtained under duress); Morocco Country Report, supra note 175 ("A[mnesty]
l[nternational] noted a sharp rise over the past 2 years in [torture and ill-treatment] in the context
of 'counter terrorism' measures as well as the failure of government authorities to investigate
these reports...."); Syria Country Report, supra note 30 ("The torture of political detainees was a
common occurrence."); Uzbekistan Country Report, supra note 175 ("Individuals arrested on
suspicion of extremism often faced severe mistreatment, including torture, beatings, and
particularly harsh prison conditions.").
178. See, e.g., Jordan Country Report, supra note 175 ("Government officials denied
allegations of torture and abuse."); Morocco Country Report, supra note 175 ("[T]he Government
denied the use of torture...."); Saudi Arabia Country Report, supra note 175 ("Canadian and
British prisoners released in 2003 reported that they had been tortured during their detention;
however, the Government denied these claims."); Syria Country Report, supra note 30 ("As a
matter of policy, the Government has denied to international human rights groups that it commits
human rights abuses."); Uzbekistan Country Report, supra note 175 ("[Jludges routinely ignored
such claims [of torture] or dismissed them as groundless."); Mayer, supra note 16 (describing one
Egyptian official's reaction to an Australian detainee's allegations of torture in an Egyptian prison
as "mythology"); Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on TransferredSuspects Doubted; PrisonersSay
Countries Break No-Torture Pledges, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at AI [hereinafter Priest, CIA
Assurances] ("'We wouldn't accept the premise that we would make a promise and violate it,'
said the Egyptian ambassador to the United States, Nabil Fahmy, whose country has accepted
rendered terrorism suspects. He denied that Egyptian officers employ torture in interrogations.").
179. See Priest, CIA Assurances, supra note 178.
180. McCaffrey, supra note 19 (quoting former CIA counterterrorism official Vincent
Cannistraro).
181. Priest, CIA Assurances, supra note 178 (quoting a U.S. official who visited the foreign
detention sites).
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and virtually impossible to monitor."'' 8 2 These statements provide
convincing evidence that U.S. officials involved with the extraordinary
rendition program not only knew that suspects were being sent to
countries where they would be tortured, but also intended that torture to
occur, thereby demonstrating that these officials are guilty of conspiracy
to commit torture under U.S. law.
II.

MECHANISMS IN U.S. LAW CAN CHALLENGE THE
PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION

The preceding section establishes that extraordinary rendition
constitutes a criminal conspiracy to commit torture under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A. As a practical consideration, however, the existence of
this crime may not be particularly meaningful to people who are victims
of extraordinary rendition.
A.

CriminalProsecution

In spite of strong evidence that extraordinary rendition violates
federal law, it is highly unlikely that U.S. prosecutors will ever bring
charges against the perpetrators. First, the very people who would be
responsible for prosecuting the crimes in the current administration have
been involved in drafting legal arguments challenging the applicability
53
of the Torture Statute to U.S. actions in the so-called war on terror."
Second, even if there were a change in executive leadership,
prosecutions would probably be unpopular, because these prosecutions
would implicate U.S. officials. Third, officials could invoke several
defenses to obstruct such prosecutions, including the state secrets
privilege 1"4 and sovereign immunity. 185 The state secrets privilege "is an
182. See id. (quoting a CIA officer involved with renditions); Zagaris, supra note 6 (citing
current and former intelligence officers, lawyers, and counter-terrorism officials involved in the
rendition program).
183. See Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of
Detainees, 17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 83 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2005/us0405/us0405.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006); David Cole, Accounting for Torture,
Comment, NATION, Mar. 21, 2005, at 4.
184. When a court ordered discovery to determine whether a U.S. citizen was being held by
the government of Saudi Arabia at the direction of the United States, Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2004), dismissed as moot sub nom. Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F.
Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2005), the initial U.S. response was to file a secret motion to dismiss. Cole,
supra note 183. When those efforts failed, the government brought the detainee to the United
States and charged him with threatening to kill President Bush. See Abu Ali, 387 F. Supp. 2d at
17.
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especially powerful weapon because federal judges, reluctant to
challenge the executive branch on national security, almost never refuse
'
the government's claim to confidentiality."186
Indeed, the government
invoked the state secrets doctrine to dismiss the suit of Canadian Maher
Arar against John Ashcroft for Arar's removal to Syria." 7 As one
Guantdinamo attorney has noted, there are mechanisms in place to
protect classified information in terrorism cases and still allow for a fair
hearing. 88 Among these mechanisms is the Classified Information
Procedures Act, which allows the government to delete or conceal
specific items of classified information from a defendant seeking
discovery of classified information. 89 Despite these safeguards, criminal
prosecution appears unlikely.
B.

Habeas Corpus

The appropriate means for persons in U.S. custody to challenge the
legality of that custody is to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. In the
case of extraordinary rendition, successful habeas petitions must
navigate three difficult hurdles. First, the detainee must consider several
jurisdictional issues to determine whether habeas is possible. Then, the
detainee must be entitled to make substantive claims in the habeas
petition. Further, the detainee faces several practical barriers to raising a
habeas claim, because his or her identity and location are kept secret.
1.

Jurisdiction

Before a court will consider the merits of a petitioner's habeas corpus
challenge, the petitioner must demonstrate both that the court has

185. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 186-90 (2004).
186. Andrew Zajac, Bush Wielding Secrecy Privilege To End Suits, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 2005,
at 1. Ironically, years after the Supreme Court case that established the basis for the privilege,
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), investigators discovered that the government in
Reynolds had been concealing incriminating evidence with no connection to state secrets. See
Barry Siegel, A Daughter Discovers What Really Happened,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2004, at Al.
187. See Memorandum in Support of the United States' Assertion of State Secrets Privilege,
Arar v. Ashcroft, CA No. 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_ Ilth/docs/ArarStateSecrets.pdf (last visited Apr. 20,
2006). The court dismissed the case on other grounds, and therefore found that the states secrets
argument was moot. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
188. See Detainees: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 36
(testimony of Guantdnamo attorney Joseph Margulies).
189. 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 4 (2006).
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territorial jurisdiction over the particular claim and that the petitioner is
"in custody."

a.

Territorial Jurisdiction

Courts have distinguished between two kinds of habeas corpus. 9 '
The first is derived from the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, 9' is
generally available to U.S. citizens and persons present in the United
States, and therefore does not apply in most detentions resulting from
extraordinary renditions. 92 The habeas statute establishes the second
type, and reads in part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge
shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district
wherein the restraint complained of is had....
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States or is committed for trial before some court
thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance
of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled
therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any
alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection or
exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction
of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and
effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
190. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476-78 (2004); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Rasul v. Bush: Unanswered Questions, 13 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103, 1112-14 (2005) (describing the constitutional and statutory habeas
analysis in Rasul).
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
192. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
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(5) It 93is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for

trial. 1
Some have suggested that the habeas statute, while not limited to
U.S. citizens, contains a clear territorial restraint. 194 The argument is

based on the phrases "within their respective jurisdictions" and "the
district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had"
in § 2241(a), and a provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 that requires that
petitions submitted to the Supreme Court must state reasons for not
submitting the petition to "the district court of the district in which the
applicant is held."' 95 A majority of the Supreme Court in 2004 rejected
this argument in Rasul v. Bush,'96 holding: "No party questions the
District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians. Section 2241,
by its terms, requires nothing more."' 9 7 Courts have interpreted Rasul to
require that detainees held at Guantdinamo bring their habeas petitions to
the District Court of the District of Columbia;'98 presumably, the same
requirement extends to others held outside of the United States.'99
Additionally, while courts generally require people detained within the
jurisdiction of a U.S. district court to bring their habeas petition in the

district where their immediate custodian is located,

°°

an exception to

the "immediate custodian rule" applies to people detained outside the
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). After this Article was written but before it went to press, the
Military Commissions Act amended the habeas statute. See Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7; see also David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Methods of the "War on
Terror," 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming Summer 2007) (demonstrating that the Military
Commissions Act's revisions to the habeas statute have little effect on the availability of habeas
for persons subjected to extraordinary rendition).
194. See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 489-91 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006).
196. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
197. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84 (citation omitted); cf Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28
(D.D.C. 2004) dismissed as moot sub nom. Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C.
2005) ("[T]he law is clear that the scattered references in the habeas statute...simply do not add
up to a jurisdictional wall against habeas petitions for citizens detained overseas.") (footnote
omitted). A 2005 amendment to defense appropriations legislation attempts to reverse Rasul. See
Lindsey Graham, Rules for Our War, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at A29; Weisman, supra note
54. The amendment text, however, would only restrict habeas jurisdiction over persons detained
at Guantdnamo, and therefore would have a negligible effect on the claims of most people
subjected to extraordinary rendition. See S. Amdt. 2524 (d)(1), 109th Cong. (2005).
198. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 2004); Gherebi v. Bush, 338 F. Supp.
2d 91, 96 (D.D.C. 2004) ("[Rasul] makes clear that this Court is the appropriate forum for the
resolution of the Guantanamo Bay detainee cases.").
199. See, e.g., Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (authorizing jurisdictional discovery to
determine whether the court could consider the habeas claim of a U.S. citizen held in Saudi
Arabia).
200. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004).
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territorial jurisdiction of any district court.2 ' Hence, the habeas statute
affords the District Court of the District of Columbia jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions of persons detained outside of the United States, as
long as that court has jurisdiction over a supervisory official.
b.

The "In Custody" Requirement

The habeas statute predicates the writ on certain conditions, including
the requirement that the petitioner be in custody. Only § 2241(c)(1)
requires that the person be held "under or by color of the authority of
the United States. 2 2 That requirement logically does not pertain to the
remaining subsections, which provide additional bases for meeting the
custody requirement. In other words, even if a person is not held "under
or by color of the authority of the United States," that person's custody
may still be within the scope of the statute if one of the other conditions
is met. Accordingly, even if a'person is not held under the terms of §
2241(c)(1), habeas is still available if the person's "custody [is] in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," as
provided by § 2241(c)(3). Courts interpret the custody requirement
loosely; actual physical custody is not required to establish habeas
jurisdiction. 2 3 As the Sixth Circuit noted:
[I]t is not necessary that the petitioner be in physical control of
the respondent. It is enough that the imprisoning sovereign is the
respondent's agent; that his liberty is restrained by the
respondent's parole conditions; or that he can point to some
continuing collateral disability which is the result of the
respondent's action.2 °
Nonetheless, "there must be some involvement of United States
25
officials. °
201. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 498 (1973);
Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 739; cf Padilla, 542 U.S. at 436 n.9 ("We have long implicitly recognized
an exception to the immediate custodian rule in the military context where an American citizen is
detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any district court.") (citation omitted). While no
court has held specifically that the exception applies to non-citizens detained in parts of the world
other than Guantinamo or the United States, it would be inconsistent with the holding of Rasul to
argue otherwise.

202. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (2006).
203. Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300 (1984).
204. Steinberg v. Police Ct. of Albany, N.Y., 610 F.2d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted).
205. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 47 (D.D.C. 2004), dismissed as moot sub nom.
Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2005).
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This broad interpretation of the custody requirement under §
2241 (c)(3) is consistent with the statutory expansion of the writ in 1867.
First, the language of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 demonstrates that
§ 2241(c)(3) affords access to habeas "in addition to the authority
already conferred by law. 2 °6 The phrase refers to authority under
existing statutory law, 0 7 which, at that time, only allowed habeas relief
where a person was in the custody of the federal government or, in very
limited situations, where a prisoner was detained by a state
government. 2 8 The legislative history of the Act is not definitive, but
immediately prior to its passage in the House of Representatives,
legislators advocated the bill to "enlarge the privilege of the writ," and
described it as "a bill of the largest liberty. 2 9 As the Supreme Court
subsequently confirmed, the impetus for the Act was to enable federal
courts to secure the liberty of formerly enslaved persons still held by
white landowners. 20 Hence, the provisions of § 2241(c)(3) can properly
be construed as extending habeas jurisdiction to people held "in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" in a
broad sense and regardless of the nature of the actual custodian.
A habeas petitioner detained as a result of an extraordinary rendition
may demonstrate sufficient involvement of U.S. officials by submitting
flight records of the CIA-leased airplane used to transfer the detainee2 1'
and collaboration with interrogators in the receiving state. Official
allegations that the United States is not presently holding a detainee
may not withstand judicial scrutiny. In interpreting the habeas statute,
courts have expressed skepticism regarding administration attempts to
manipulate the location of a prisoner in order to avoid jurisdiction,
including attempts to use foreign countries as proxies for the federal

206. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385.
207. See Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered,70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1102-03 (1995).
208. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996).
209. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 190 (1980);
Forsythe, supra note 207, at 1111 (citation omitted).
210. Id. at 1111-12; see Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318, 322, 324-25 (1867). Senators were
unclear as to the purpose of the bill, but their concerns primarily focused on the exemptions for
military cases and the bill's effect on the status of people confined as a result of the Civil War.
See Forsythe, supra note 207, at 1113-15.
211. Such flight records have provided strong corroborating evidence in several rendition
cases. See John Crewdson & Tom Hundley, Jet's Travels Cloaked in Mystery, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
20, 2005, at 1; Grey, Torture Flights, supra note 20; Michael Hirsh et al., Aboard Air CIA,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 32; Tim Reid, Flight to Torture: Where Abuse Is ContractedOut,
TIMES (London), March 26, 2005, at 43.
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government in order to evade habeas jurisdiction. 12 Therefore, courts
are likely to find that the custody requirement of the habeas statute does
not bar consideration of a habeas petition brought by a person who has
been subjected to extraordinary rendition.
2.

Merits of the Habeas Claim

The historic purpose of the writ of habeas corpus "has been to relieve
detention by executive authorities without judicial trial ' 213 and "it is in
2 4 The habeas
that context that its protections have been strongest.""
statute allows petitioners to assert they are in custody "in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Therefore,
there are three potential categories of merits claims: constitutional
claims, claims based on treaties, and claims based on federal law.
Because § 2241(c)(3) was added in its entirety in 1867, rules of
statutory construction suggest that each of the three categories has a
unique meaning and serves a unique purpose.215
a.

Constitutional Claims

Habeas claims traditionally focus on violation of a prisoner's
constitutional rights. While the Court in Rasul ruled that jurisdiction
was appropriate over the Guantinamo petitioners' habeas claims, it
arguably did not establish that petitioners had any substantive
constitutional rights to bring before the court.21 6 Courts have frequently
held that because non-citizens outside of the United States do not have
any entitlement to life, liberty, or property with respect to the U.S.
government, they do not have any rights under the U.S. Constitution.2 17

212. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004); id. at 454 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Abu Ali v. Ashcrofl, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 2004) dismissed as moot sub nom. Abu Ali
v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[T]he Court holds that the United States may
not avoid the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts by enlisting a foreign ally as an
intermediary to detain the citizen.").
213. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
214. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
215. See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (articulating the canon that every
phrase is presumed to have meaning).
216. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006) (noting that Rasul decided a narrow question of jurisdiction and did not establish judicially
enforceable rights).
217. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
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A person deprived of liberty by the United States, however, may have
a valid due process claim, regardless of the location of detention.218
When the government of the United States takes affirmative acts to
restrain the liberty of a non-citizen, the writ of habeas corpus acts as a
means to check executive abuses. At a minimum, substantive due
process bars government actions that "shock the conscience.,, 219 The
government conduct involved in extraordinary rendition potentially
shocks the conscience, and therefore detainees can raise a valid Fifth
Amendment challenge to extraordinary rendition regardless of whether
they have other constitutional rights. Habeas petitioners held abroad can
establish that the government's behavior shocks the conscience under
the due process precepts of the Fifth Amendment, which focus on the
actions of-the government, and include the inherent entitlement of all
persons to be free from outrageous government treatment such as
torture.22 °
b.

Treaty Claims

Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that non-citizens detained
overseas have no valid constitutional claim, they still may challenge
their custody as violating the treaties or laws of the United States. If
habeas were limited to cases in which a prisoner's constitutional rights
were violated by the detention, then the words "or laws or treaties" in §
2241(c)(3) would be superfluous. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
observed that the use of the writ at common law was not limited to
challenging executive detention on the grounds of constitutional error.22'
In the immigration and deportation context, courts have addressed the
possibility of raising habeas claims based not on constitutional rights,
but on treaties.

218. See Asahi v. Sup. Ct. of Calif., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (holding that
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with no minimum contacts with
the forum state exceeded the limits of due process).
219. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
220. Cf Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 267-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (declining to
foreclose consideration of Arar's constitutional claims in challenging his detention and removal
to Syria while in transit through the United States); id. at 274-83 (finding that national security
concerns precluded consideration of Arar's substantive due process claims). Arar did not use the
habeas statute to establish his claim, and therefore these holdings are not directly applicable to the
conclusions of this section. See id. at 279 n. 12 ("Precisely what, if any, remedy might have been
available to Arar via habeas is uncertain.").
221. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302-03 (2001).
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First, a court will examine the scope of the treaty. For the most part,
the United States does not follow the primarily monist system of
countries such as Austria, where most treaties, once ratified,
automatically become national law. The U.S. system adopts some
features of the dualist approach, in which a ratified treaty establishes
affirmative obligations to the other parties to the treaties, but may not be
used to assert claims in domestic courts without some form of statutory
enactment.22 2 In the United States, however, if a treaty's language is
sufficiently clear to be enforced by a domestic court, a petitioner may
use clauses from the treaty to petition a court directly for enforcement.
As the Supreme Court explained in Foster v. Neilson:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in the courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without
the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
223
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
Therefore, when the Senate gives advice and consent to a treaty, it
examines the provisions of the treaty under existing federal and state
law to determine whether additional legislation is necessary to effect
provisions of the treaty. 224 Courts have looked to the intent of the treaty
parties for guidance in determining whether a treaty is self-executing.225
The Senate, in giving its advice and consent to the Convention Against
Torture, expressly stated that the agreement was not self-executing.226

222. For a discussion of the distinctions between the two tendencies, see Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L. REv. 853, 864-66 (1987).
223. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
224. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate's advice and
consent to the Convention Against Torture).
225. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833). For multilateral treaties,
however, intent is not the most appropriate standard. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of
Self-Executing Treaties and GATT- A Notable German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 550
(1971). Other factors to consider include the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole,
circumstances surrounding execution of the treaty, the nature of the obligations imposed by the
agreement, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms, the
implications of permitting a private right of action, and the capability of the judiciary to resolve
the dispute. See Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985).
226. The Senate made similar statements in providing advice and consent to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S478 1-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992), and
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While the administration insists that such statements prohibit courts

from recognizing independently enforceable private causes of action
under those instruments,227 such statements may not always be
dispositive.225 Moreover, some provisions of a treaty may be selfexecuting while others are not. 29

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the district court's
decision

in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, held that the

1949 Geneva

Conventions do "not confer...a right to enforce its provisions in
court. '23 ° This opinion is based on a mistaken reading of Supreme Court
precedent and a misunderstanding of habeas law. In Johnson v.
Eisentrager,the Supreme Court held that the 1929 Geneva Convention
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC.
S660 1-01 (daily ed., June 8, 1994).
227. Elimination of Racial Discrimination:HearingBefore the Senate ForeignRels. Comm.,
103d Cong. (May 11, 1994) (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Department of State Legal Adviser)
("By making clear that this convention is not self-executing, we ensure that it does not create a
new or independently enforceable private cause of action in U.S. Courts.").
228. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "SelfExecuting" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 526 (1991) ("[T]he
decision whether a treaty is self-executing is ordinarily made by the courts on the basis of criteria
elaborated in court decisions."). One justification for disregarding the assertion that a treaty does
not create an independently enforceable private cause of action is that the Senate frequently
insists that the provisions of human rights instruments are already provided for under existing
U.S. law. See Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 227 (statement of Conrad K.
Harper, Department of State Legal Adviser) ("As was the case with the earlier treaties, existing
U.S. law provides extensive protection and remedies against racial discrimination sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the present convention.... [T]he qualifications on U.S. ratification.. .do
not undermine the central tenets or purposes of the convention."). If it becomes apparent that the
Senate underestimated the scope of U.S. law so that it undermines the purpose of a treaty, the
courts may allow a private cause of action regardless of any express statement that a treaty is not
self-executing. See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in
United States Courts, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 43 (1992). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 735 (2004):
[A]lthough the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] does bind the
United States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on
the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create
obligations enforceable in the federal courts.... Accordingly, Alvarez cannot say that the
[Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] and Covenant themselves establish the
relevant and applicable rule of international law.
For a thorough critique of these two sentences in Sosa, see Malvina Halberstam, AlvarezMachain II: The Supreme Court's Reliance on the Non-Self-Executing Declarationin the Senate
Resolution Giving Advice and Consent to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 89 (2005).
229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 136, § 111 cmt. h. n.10.
230. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2763-64 (2006) (declining to reach the issue of
whether Hamdan's statutory or constitutional habeas rights had been violated).
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was not judicially enforceable. 23 ' The circuit court neglected to note,
however, that the Supreme Court in Eisentrager based its analysis on
constitutional habeas, rather than on statutory habeas.232 As noted above,
constitutional habeas is generally reserved for citizens and others
present in the United States, but statutory habeas is not so limited. The
circuit court mistakenly concluded that Eisentrager was based on
statutory habeas, disregarding the Supreme Court's recent clarification
of that ruling in Rasul.233 A more accurate synthesis of precedent
suggests that the word "treaties" in § 2241(c)(3) allows individuals
directly to challenge their detention if that detention is in violation of a
treaty.
There are several additional arguments in favor of this conclusion.
First, a habeas claim is distinguished from a treaty-based "private right
of action" that might be barred absent statutory provisions.234 Second,

the language of the Convention Against Torture is sufficiently clear for
a court to determine that someone is being held in violation of the terms
of the treaty. Third, in Wang v. Ashcroft,235 the Second Circuit suggested
that as long as Congress has enacted some legislation to implement a
treaty, as it has for the Convention Against Torture, the treaty
establishes rights enforceable through habeas petitions, unless Congress
has expressly prohibited habeas. 236 Fourth, to limit habeas challenges to
"private rights of action" explicitly legislated by Congress would make
the phrase "or laws or treaties" in the habeas statute redundant.
A habeas petitioner asserting treaty rights under the Convention
Against Torture must overcome FARRA's attempt to impose strict
limits on judicial review of claims brought under Article 3 of the
Convention. 237 The petitioner should draw upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Ex parte Yerger: "We are not at liberty to except from
231. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950).
232. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79.
233. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40 ("Eisentrageralso answers Hamdan's argument that the habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, permits courts to enforce the 'treaty-based individual rights' set
forth in the Geneva Convention."); cf Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (explaining that Eisentragerwas
not based on statutory habeas).
234. See Atuar v. United States, No. 04-7731, 2005 WL 3134081, at *6 n.12 (4th Cir. Nov.
23, 2005) ("[W]e recognize the possibility that a habeas corpus petition may require a court to
review a particular detention in light of a non-self-executing but constitutionally ratified treaty.").
235. 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
236. See id. at 141 n.16 ("Accordingly, the issue in this case-as in St. Cyr-is whether a
statute has explicitly excluded a particular claim from the jurisdictional grant of § 2241."); see
also supra note 193 (noting that the 2006 revisions to the habeas statute do not affect most cases

of extraordinary rendition).
237. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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'
[habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law."238
Accordingly, in St. Cyr the Court held that a similar statutory restriction
on judicial review of agency decisions did not bar habeas challenges
unless the legislation explicitly stated such a prohibition.23 9 The Second
Circuit, applying St. Cyr, held that § 2242(d) of FARRA does not bar
habeas petitions under the Torture Convention.24 ° Therefore, a petitioner
may successfully raise a Torture Convention claim under the treaty
provision of the habeas statute.

c.

Claims Based in Federal Law

Even if courts reject this application of the habeas writ to enforce a
treaty, a detainee may also challenge the detention as violating the laws
of the United States. The laws of the United States are comprised of
both statutory and common law and common law includes customary
international law.24' The traditional rights-based use of habeas is rooted
in the historical expansion of the writ to enable post-conviction
challenges to the judgments of state courts. 42 In such situations, the
prisoner does not usually accuse the government of violating the law or
a treaty by means of detention; nobody would challenge a government's
right to detain a prisoner subject to a sentence by a court of law. Hence,
cases in which persons held in custody in violation of the laws of the
United States, while possibly not in violation of the Constitution, are
understandably rare. 243 Nonetheless, a detainee may invoke habeas when
some aspect of the detention itself is a criminal act in violation of
federal law. The Supreme Court has affirmed that habeas allows
challenges to detentions based on "the erroneous application or
interpretation of statutes." 2" The federal government's interpretation of
the scope of the Torture Statute to exclude culpability for extraordinary
rendition constitutes such an erroneous interpretation of statute.
238. 75 U.S. 85, 102 (1869).
239. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001).
240. Wang, 320 F.3d at 141.
241. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our
law.").
242. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
777 (1950).
243. If, for example, a person is kidnapped by state authorities and held incommunicado, the
state authorities presumably have committed the crime of kidnapping, but they also have deprived
the person of his or her Constitutional rights. Therefore, the Constitutional claim is the focus of
such a habeas proceeding; the criminal aspect of the governmental behavior is not of particular
relevance.
244. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302.
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The judicial and statutory restraints on the use of habeas, including
the requirement that a petitioner exhaust all claims and opportunities for
appeal prior to resorting to habeas, derive from petitioners using the writ
to challenge the judgment of a court, or, in military settings, the
jurisdiction of a court to hear a case.245 In the first instance, res judicata
concerns justify constraining the use of habeas. In the second instance,
courts defer to tribunals that have been established or authorized by
Congress. Extraordinary rendition implicates neither of these concerns.
The detainee typically has not been convicted of a crime, nor has any
military tribunal ordered the detention or transfer. Hence, a court
asserting habeas jurisdiction over an extraordinary rendition claim does
not face the traditional worries about overstepping the authority of
another court. Instead, the detainee has not accessed any tribunal at all.
This warrants a broader review of the conditions of confinement. Justice
Murphy, in his dissent in Application of Yamashita, explained this
justification:
I do not feel that we should be confined by the traditional lines of
review drawn in connection with the use of the writ by ordinary
criminals who have direct access to the judiciary in the first
instance. Those held by the military lack any such access;
consequently the judicial review available by habeas corpus must
be wider than usual in order that the proper standards of justice
may be enforceable.246
Even in Yamashita, the petitioner challenged the validity of the
military tribunal, like the claims in Eisentrager and Hamdan. Justice
Murphy's arguments are even stronger when applied to extraordinary
renditions, which are not governed by any judicial process.
Habeas may be used to challenge not only the fact of a person's
confinement, but also the conditions of that confinement. 47 In the case
of extraordinary rendition, detainees are challenging a condition of their
confinement-namely, that they have been, or soon will be, handed
over to a third country where they are likely to be subjected to torture.

245. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1950) ("The policy
underlying [28 U.S.C. § 2254] is as pertinent to the collateral attack of military judgments as it is
to collateral attack of judgments rendered in state courts. If an available procedure has not been
employed... any interference by the federal court may be wholly needless.").
246. 327 U.S. 1, 31 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
247. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 303 (2001); id. at 303 n.14. But see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
521-22, 531 (2003) (holding that mandatory detention of certain deportable non-citizens does not
violate the due process clause, even if it would be a violation for U.S. citizens).
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As demonstrated above, such a transfer constitutes a criminal act under
the Torture Statute. Normally, a detainee must exhaust all claims within
the military or state court system before raising a claim in a federal
district court.2 48 But when a person has no access to any court or tribunal
whatsoever, and assuming for the sake of argument that the person may
be lawfully detained as an "enemy combatant" for an indefinite
period,249 courts should afford that person broad latitude in challenging
the conditions of his or her confinement when those conditions are
alleged to be in violation of the laws of the United States. The judicial
role in habeas is particularly important when the executive branch
facilitates or even imposes conditions of detention that Congress has
expressly declared to be criminal.25 ° Further, the Supreme Court recently
suggested that federal common law may enable federal courts to
recognize private claims for torture.'
Habeas compels the
administration to show that the detention is not in violation of federal
law,252 and avoids issues of sovereign immunity.253
The habeas claims of Guantdnamo detainees shed some light on the
District Court of the District of Columbia's understanding of habeas.
Many Guantdnamo detainees have filed habeas claims challenging the
legality of the detention. Most judges hearing those claims have even
been willing to grant injunctive relief requiring thirty days' notice prior
to transfer. 4 The court usually justifies the injunction primarily as a
means to maintain its jurisdiction, rather than to prevent extraordinary
rendition. 5 The government maintains that Guantdnamo detainees,
when transferred, are either released or handed over to the custody of
another government, with no further involvement or control of the
United States. Two judges have accepted this claim, maintaining that
248. See Gusik, 340 U.S. at 131-32.
249. But see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
250. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
251. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004).
252. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd in
part,rev 'd in part on other grounds, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002).
253. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 313-15 (1999).
254. See, e.g., Kurnaz v. Bush, 2005 WL 839542 at *2-*3 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005); Al-Joudi
v. Bush, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6265, at *21-*22 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,2005); AI-Marri v. Bush, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6259, at *1-*2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005); Abdah v. Bush, 2005 WL 711814, at
*6-*7 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005). But see, e.g., Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (D.D.C.
2005) (denying injunction); Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp. 2d 72, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2005)
(denying injunction requiring thirty days' notice but requiring the Pentagon to inform the court
when transfer takes place).
255. See, e.g., Abdah, 2005 WL 711814 at 4.
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such transfers do not constitute extraordinary rendition, because the
United States does not maintain any degree of control over the prisoner
after transfer. 6 The administration also asserts that it has in place
numerous procedural safeguards to ensure that detainees transferred into
the custody of another country are not be tortured.2 57 Yet recent

developments suggest that the Pentagon is unofficially transferring
Guantdinamo detainees into the custody of other governments.258
Lawyers for the Justice Department reportedly "waged an unusually

aggressive fight for the right" not to be required to give thirty days'
notice for the Yemeni detainees at Guantdnamo. 259 Given a potential

joint venture between the United States and some foreign jailors,26° the
use of habeas to contest transfers from Guantdtnamo and foreign
locations is increasingly important. The habeas statute may provide a
means for detainees to challenge extraordinary rendition as a violation
of federal laws criminalizing torture and conspiracy to commit torture.
3.

PracticalConsiderations

256. Almurbati, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 79; Al-Anazi, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 191-92.
257. See, e.g., Al-Anazi, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
258. See supra note 52. The Department of Defense press release indicates that only one
detainee was handed over "to the government of Spain." The other detainees were transferred "to
Saudi Arabia" or to other countries, but not explicitly to the governments of those countries. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Detainee Transfer Announced (July 20, 2005), availableat
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050720-4122.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). Yet
news reports confirm that at least one detainee who officially was transferred "to Saudi Arabia"
was initially transferred to the custody of the Saudi government. See Thomas Adcock, Paul Weiss
Group Aids Detainee, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 2005, at 16.
259. See David Johnston, Judge Limits the Transfer of 13 from Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2005, at A14.
260. See, e.g., Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2004), dismissed as
moot sub nom. Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2005):
The case law indicates that this [custody] inquiry will entail a consideration of
several factors, including whether: (i) Abu Ali was detained at the behest of United
States officials; (ii) his ongoing detention is at the direction of the United States
enlisting a foreign state as an agent or intermediary who is indifferent to the detention of
the prisoner; (iii) he is being detained in the foreign state to deny him an opportunity to
assert his rights in a United States tribunal; and (iv) he would be released upon nothing
more than a request by the United States.... Where all of these factors are present.. .it
blinks reality to conclude that the detainee is anything other than in the custody of the
United States for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.
The evidence that petitioners have supplied is considerable in the absence of
discovery, and speaks to each of these points. What is more, with a single narrow
exception, the United States has not offered evidence to rebut any of the information
supplied and inferences reasonably raised by petitioners, even though such evidence is
in many instances directly in its control.
(footnotes and citations omitted).
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Detainees subject to extraordinary rendition face tremendous
challenges in bringing their claims to court. They are typically seized in
secret, and the few detainees who had counsel prior to their rendition
found that their attorneys were not notified until after the rendition was
complete. 6' A habeas petition may be raised by the detainee's "next
friend," but that person must first have some reason to believe that the
detainee is, in fact, a detainee. 62 In some instances witnesses can verify
the abduction,2 63 but in other cases the person simply "disappears." 2" In
many circumstances, the detainees' friends and family are entirely
unaware that the person has even been taken into custody.2 65
At the point the next friend suspects that a person has been detained,
the next friend may bring a habeas petition. The petition forces the
detaining authority to confirm or deny whether the person is in custody,
as broadly defined under the habeas statute.26 6
Another practical reality is the administration's assertion that judicial
oversight relating to transfer of terror suspects could unreasonably
hamper military efforts; this rationale was a basis for the Supreme
2 67 Yet extraordinary rendition inherently
Court's ruling in Eisentrager.
involves moving suspects from one place to another. There is little
additional burden imposed by ordering a custodian to keep the detainee
in custody until either the court determines the detainee's right to
release or the custodian releases the detainee. Additionally, the burden
on the military appears negligible, because renditions are carried out

261. See, e.g., Agiza, supra note 140, 13.9; cf Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 46,
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (C.A. No. 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP)
[hereinafter Arar Complaint] (documenting that the INS lied to Arar's attorney about his
whereabouts two days prior to his removal).
262. The requirements for "next friend" standing are articulated in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990). One commentator has advocated more relaxed interpretation of the next
friend standards when military prisoners are detained overseas. See Caroline Nasrallah Belk,
Note, Next FriendStanding and the War on Terror, 53 DUKE L.J. 1747 (2004).
263. See, e.g., Grey, Torture Flights, supra note 20; Mayer, supra note 16.
264. For example, when Abu Omar was abducted in Italy and then transferred to Egypt, his
wife originally thought that he had simply left her. See Crewdson & Hundley, supra note 211.
265. See id.; supra note 14. Recall that one justification for rendition is to conceal the
detention from the suspect's associates. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
266. Presumably the administration could assert the state secrets defense at this point. It is
unlikely, however, that courts would allow such broad executive authority, particularly when the
claims raised in the petition indicate that members of the executive are potentially in violation of
federal statute, In at least one case, the government refused to acknowledge a transfer for several
months. See Arar Complaint, supra note 261, 60.
267. See Eisentrager v. Johnson, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950); Brief for the Respondents at
16-17, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
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primarily by the CIA. Therefore, these potential practical obstacles
would not necessarily bar a habeas claim.
In summary, the habeas statute is a potentially powerful tool to
challenge extraordinary rendition. The broad jurisdictional reach of the
habeas statute offers few impediments for a detainee held abroad to
bring a habeas claim before a U.S. court. The merits of the habeas claim
may be grounded in constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, treaty claims under the Convention Against Torture, and
statutory prohibitions criminalizing torture and conspiracy to commit
torture. As long as a qualified individual is able to bring the claim as the
detainee's next friend, a court would have several legitimate substantive
bases on which to order the detainee's release from custody.
C.

AdditionalMeasures

Habeas corpus is not the only viable mechanism to challenge the
practice of extraordinary rendition. Congress has considered several
measures to restrict government authority to subject individuals to
torture, including funding restrictions, uniform interrogation standards,
investigations of CIA misconduct, and explicit prohibitions on
extraordinary rendition. After they are released from foreign detention,
individuals may seek to bring tort claims against government officials
involved in extraordinary rendition. In addition, the Convention Against
Torture requires States Parties to initiate criminal prosecutions of
persons responsible for extraordinary rendition; if the United States fails
to initiate such prosecutions, other countries may undertake the task.
Moreover, international bodies may hold accountable countries that
assist in the U.S. extraordinary rendition program. This section
addresses each of these mechanisms in turn.
Some members of Congress have proposed remedial measures which
could potentially curb the use of extraordinary rendition. In 2005,
Congress adopted a restriction on emergency spending legislation that
no funds may be used to subject anyone in U.S. custody to torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. It is unclear whether the
condition applies to people who are subject to rendition or to noncitizens. 2165 One could argue that the restriction's "in custody"
requirement actually encourages the use of extraordinary rendition.

268. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 1031(a)(1), 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see
also Knight, supra note 15.

642

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 46:4

Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), the only member of Congress known
to be a survivor of torture, introduced amendments to the. 2006 Defense
Authorization legislation that would have established uniform
interrogation standards based on the U.S. Army Field Manual and
prohibited torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment at the hands of U.S. personnel. As with the
2005 spending restrictions, these amendments would not have regulated
the practice of rendition, and they might even have created incentives to
use extraordinary rendition to avoid the interrogation restrictions.269
Hence, the McCain amendments would have failed to curtail the
practice of extraordinary rendition. Moreover, McCain's capitulation to
the Bush administration on the Military Commissions Act suggests that
congressional leaders may lack the will to impose statutory restrictions
on CIA interrogations.2 70
The CIA has announced that it is conducting its own internal
investigation of possible misconduct in the treatment of terror suspects,
but the investigation does not address extraordinary rendition.271
Democratic congressional leaders are pressing for a congressional
investigation, and after the 2006 midterm elections, they are likely to
use their control of Congress to engage in heightened oversight. 72 A
classified, bipartisan investigation of CIA abuses has commenced, but it
is unclear whether the investigation will be independent or impartial.
The Senate has called for the CIA to provide regular reports on its secret

269. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Moreover, Senator McCain abandoned
his efforts by endorsing more relaxed interrogation standards in the Military Commissions Act.
See Nat Hentoff, Habeas Corpus Sellout: Why Did McCain and Company Back Bush Bill?,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at A19.
270. See Hentoff, supra note 269. But see Stephen Richard, InterrogatorsBeware, WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2006 (contending that the Military Commissions Act imposes significant
constraints on CIA interrogators).
271. See Thomas, supra note 28; Human Rights; U.S. Restates Opposition to Torture; Other
Developments, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., May 12, 2005; cf Christopher Graveline,
Unlearned Lessons of Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2006 (noting that the CIA never
released the results of its internal investigation of abuses at Abu Ghraib).
272. See, e.g., Rep. Edward Markey, Press Release, Markey Calls on Bush Administration to
Apologize to Maher Arar (Jan. 26, 2007), http://Markey.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=2564&ltemd=137 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); see also John Cavanagh,
Truth, Justice, and the Un-American Way, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 5, 2006, at 9; Dana
Priest, Democrats Seek Probes on CIA Interrogations, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at A7
[hereinafter Priest, Democrats]; Editorial, Abuse in Secret, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at B6.
273. Providing for Consideration of H.R. 2475, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, CONG. REC. H4829-40 (daily ed., June 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jane Harman (DCal.)).
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detention facilities, but this oversight may not extend to facilities
arguably run by foreign governments. 7 4
Beyond fiscal and investigatory responses, two legislators in the
109th Congress introduced bills to combat extraordinary rendition. A
bill sponsored by Representative Markey (D-Mass.) in the House of
Representatives would have explicitly banned extraordinary rendition.275
A bill sponsored by Senator Leahy (D-Vt.) would have compelled the
State Department to publish a list of countries known to torture, and
then would have forbidden the United States from sending detainees to
those countries. 76 With the 1 10th Congress under the control of the
Democratic Party, there is a greater likelihood that such legislation will
be enacted.277 Yet such laws could lead to political pressure on the State
Department to sanitize its human rights reports in order to assist the
executive's so-called war on terror.7 The consequences of such a
response would be far-reaching; not only would extraordinary rendition
continue, but also many petitioners for asylum and Torture Convention
relief, who depend on State Department reports to substantiate their
claims,279 could be sent home to be subjected to human rights violations.
Moreover, to the extent that these legislative proposals are perceived as
imposing restraints on the CIA, they might face significant political
opposition. Nonetheless, the 10th Congress is seriously considering
legislation to reverse much of the Military Commissions Act, to restore
accountability for the treatment of detainees, and to prohibit U.S.
tribunals from using evidence obtained through coercion.2 0 These
efforts suggest that the Democratic-controlled Congress will engage in
stricter oversight over the CIA's extraordinary rendition program.
Private claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act against the private
pilots or businesses involved with the chartered aircraft used in

274. See Jehl, Secret Prisons, supra note 50.
275. Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act, H.R. 952, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Talk of the
Nation: Policy of Extraordinary Rendition (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 7, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.)).
276. Convention Against Torture Implementation Act of 2005, S. 654, 109th Cong. (2005);
see also Talk of the Nation, supra note 275 (statement of Michael Hirsh, Newsweek reporter).
277. See, e.g., Markey, supra note 272.
278. Cf L. Kathleen Roberts, The United States and the World: Changing Approaches to
Human Rights Diplomacy Under the Bush Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 631, 647
(2003) (noting several instances in which reports were "soften[ed]" to be less critical of allies in
the so-called war on terror).
279. See Kirsten Schlenger, The Nuts and Bolts of Representing an Asylum Applicant, 1080
PLI/Corp. 209, 215 (1998).
280. See Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007, S. 576 (110th Cong.).
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extraordinary renditions"' may also provide a means of addressing
rendition after it has occurred.282 If those charter agencies are actually
businesses covertly owned and operated by the CIA or Defense
Department,283 they may attempt to assert a sovereign immunity
defense.284 In the first civil suit challenging the practice of extraordinary
rendition, German national Khaled el-Masri filed a complaint under the
Alien Tort Statute against CIA chief George Tenet and two charter
airline companies involved in his rendition to Afghanistan. 85 The
complaint specifically alleged that the defendants were responsible for
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment inflicted on elMasri during his detention.286 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has
suggested that his rendition was a mistake,287 but even though el-Masri's
civil complaint was dismissed on state secrets grounds, German
prosecutors are pursuing criminal actions against officials involved with
the rendition.288
Other countries can and should take action to stop extraordinary
renditions. The Convention Against Torture explicitly requires States
Parties to take action when the conventions are breached in any nation.

281. See supra note 211.
282. See Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
283. There are strong indications that many of the charter companies are CIA front
corporations. See Scott Shane et al., CIA Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter
Flights, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005.
284. See supra note 51 (noting sovereign immunity barriers to use of the Alien Tort Claims
Act); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 562, 712 (2004) (limiting the scope of the Federal Tort
Claims Act waiver of sovereign immunity). But see For CIA Agents, Insurance Sometimes
Necessary: Morning Edition (National Public Radio Broadcast Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.npr.org/dmg/dmg.php?prgCode=ME&showDate= I4-Dec-2005&segNum = 15&
mediaPref-RM&getUnderwriting=1 (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) (reporting that the CIA strongly
encourages agents to obtain private liability insurance because the government frequently will not
defend them if they are later sued or criminally prosecuted for actions during foreign missions);
Tracy Wilkinson, Ex-CIA Agent in Milan Asks for Immunity, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at A3
(reporting that an Italian judge rejected a former CIA agent's immunity defense).
285. See Complaint, EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No.
1:05cv 1417), available at http://www.aclu.com/images/extraordinaryrendition/assetupload_
file829_22211 .pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
286. See id. 83-92.
287. See Condoleezza Rice, Press Availability with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Dec.
6, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmi/2005/57672.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) (quoting
German Chancellor Merkel, "[T]he American Administration [] has admitted that this man had
been erroneously taken and...is not denying that it has taken place."); see also Priest, Mistake,
supra note 142 ("The CIA inspector general is investigating a growing number of what it calls
erroneous renditions.....").
288. See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. at 535-39; Nat Hentoff, Time to Halt Renditions: Congress
Needs to Act, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at A19.
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The Convention contains provisions obliging States Parties to "extradite
or prosecute." Under Article 5(2), every State Party must take "such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over [the
offenses of torture and complicity in torture] in cases where the alleged
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not
extradite him pursuant to article 8" to the jurisdiction where the offense
was committed or to the jurisdiction where the alleged perpetrator or the
accused is a national. 289 Article 7 then directs a State Party with
territorial jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed torture,
attempted torture, or complicity in torture either to extradite the person
to the country where that person or the victim is a national, or to the
country where the alleged acts occurred.2 90 A State Party may not
simply wait for an extradition request before taking any action with
respect to the alleged torturer or torture-conspirator; the parties involved
in drafting the Torture Convention considered such proposals and
rejected them.29 1 In the case of extraordinary rendition, the other States
Parties that could prosecute alleged torturer-conspirators are unlikely to
assert jurisdiction.2 92 The United States, as the country of which the
alleged perpetrator is probably a national, is highly unlikely to take
action against its own government agents. Due to the secrecy
surrounding rendition, the country of the victim of the rendition may not
even know that the person has been transferred; in some cases, however,
prosecutors in other countries have brought indictments against U.S.
officials involved with extraordinary renditions of their nationals.293 Yet
because rendition victims are characterized as terrorists, a country may
not wish to step forward and assert the rights of its own national. 294 The
289. Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 5(2).
290. Id. art. 7(1).
291. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 116, at 137.
292. See Francisco Forrest Martin, The International Human Rights and Ethical Aspects of
the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101, 117 (2003-04)
(explaining that there is strictly limited discretion in cases concerning gross human rights
violations so as to ensure that there will be a judicial remedy); Michael P. Scharf, Application of
Treaty-Based UniversalJurisdiction to Nationals ofNon-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363,
368-69 (2001) ("Crimes subject to the universality principle occur.. in situations in which the
territorial State and State of the accused's nationality are unlikely to exercise jurisdiction,
because, for example, the perpetrators are State authorities or agents of the State.").
293. See, e.g., Hentoff, supra note 288 (reporting that German prosecutors are preparing
arrest warrants for over one dozen CIA agents involved in the extraordinary rendition of German
national Khaled el-Masri).
294. CNN Live From: Saudi Arabia Speaks Out About Terrorism (CNN television broadcast
May 16, 2003) (statement of Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Foreign Affairs Advisor) ("We are on board
200 percent to find the criminals who did this [and] those who support them, and justify them,
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country where the torture has taken place-generally the destination
country for the rendition-is also highly unlikely to take any action to
expose its interrogation practices to judicial scrutiny. Therefore,
extraordinary rendition presents situations uniquely suited to a State
Party asserting jurisdiction simply because the alleged perpetrator is
physically located within its jurisdiction.
Once a State Party has determined that an alleged offender is located
within its jurisdiction, the Torture Convention requires the State Party
first to take the alleged offender into custody, and then immediately to
make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.295 This initial act may be
sufficient to prompt the United States to move to extradite the alleged
offender. The Bush administration has been resistant to foreign courts
asserting jurisdiction over U.S. personnel overseas; the administration
could use extradition as a tool in response to a foreign government's
assertion of jurisdiction.2 96 The United States could only compel
extradition, however, if it could convince the sending state that the
United States would follow through with prosecution.297 Accordingly,
application of the extradite-or-prosecute provisions of the Torture
Convention could force the hand of the U.S. government and compel a
criminal inquiry into the practice of extraordinary rendition.
States Parties that participate in extraordinary rendition may also be
held accountable for complicity, even for "seemingly innocuous acts"
that facilitate extraordinary rendition, including allowing airplanes
carrying detainees to refuel on their territory.29 The Council of Europe
and bring them to justice. We will work with the United States and every other country that can
provide assistance in order to unravel this terrorist network."); cf supra note 10 (noting that West
Germany chose not to intervene on behalf of Adolf Eichmann after he was abducted by Israeli
agents in Argentina and brought to Israel to stand trial for war crimes). But see Richard Bernstein,
Germany Says It Pressedthe U.S. over the Detention ofIts Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at
A 13 (reporting that the German government had made repeated requests for information from the
U.S. government during the extraordinary rendition of German citizen Khaled el-Masri).
295. Convention Against Torture, supra note 57, art. 6(l)-(2).
296. See Harvey Rishikof, Framing International Rights with a Janusism Edge-Foreign
Policy and Class Actions-Legal Institutions as Soft Power, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 273
(2003); Jennifer Trahan, Trying a Bin Laden and Others: Evaluating the Optionsfor Terrorist
Trials, 24 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 475, 495 n.100 (2002). If the United States declines to extradite
twenty-two CIA operatives charged with kidnapping for a 2003 extraordinary rendition in Italy,
the Italian prosecutor said he intends to try the agents in absentia. See John Crewdson, Italy
Prosecutor,Boss Clash over CIA Case, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2005, at C6.
297. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor International Crimes: Historical
Perspectivesand ContemporaryPractice,42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 160 (2001).
298. See All Party Parliamentary Group Briefing Paper, Torture by Proxy: International Law
Applicable to 'Extraordinary Renditions,' Dec. 2005, at 13. Some countries may be more
concerned with the political and security ramifications of complicity or collaboration with the
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initiated an inquiry into "illegal and inhuman practices in relation to the
arrest, transportation and detention of persons" in its member and
observer countries, and stated that, "If the allegations [are] proved
correct, the member states would stand accused of having seriously
' In
breached their human rights obligations to the Council of Europe."299
early 2007, the Council of Europe adopted a final report in which it
condemned the practice of extraordinary rendition and also condemned
"the acceptance and concealing" of extraordinary rendition "on several
occasions, by the secret services and governmental authorities of certain
European countries."3 ' Some European countries have already taken
action to prosecute persons responsible for extraordinary renditions
originating on their territory or involving their own nationals.3 ' This
attention suggests that international bodies may hold accountable U.S.
partners in extraordinary rendition. Whether through habeas corpus
petitions, congressional oversight, tort actions, or international
initiatives, many vehicles exist to challenge the practice of extraordinary
rendition.
III.

CONCLUSION

When Congress criminalized torture, it probably never envisioned the
necessity of using that law against people acting on behalf of the United
States. Yet today the executive branch policy of extraordinary rendition
violates the Torture Statute. The extraordinary rendition system which
was originally designed to extend the ability of U.S. criminal courts to
bring criminals to justice has been twisted into an international
abduction and torture conspiracy. Today, the administration uses
rendition both to bar detainees from gaining access to courts and to
U.S. extraordinary rendition program. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fleishman, Individual Rights Must Be
Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, at A9 (reporting that Romania fears that its application for
membership in the European Union may be jeopardized by links to CIA activities); Ken
Silverstein, U.S. Partnershipwith Jordan Was Targeted, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at Al
(reporting that suicide bombings in Amman, Jordan targeted the country's intelligence
partnership with the United States).
299. Dick Marty, Alleged Existence of Secret Detention Centres in Council of Europe
Member States, Statement, Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Press/
StopPressView.asp?CPID=1714 (last visited Apr. 20, 2006); see also Katrin Bennhold,
Kidnapping Study Tends to Fault US. Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at A10; Standing
Committee Statement, supra note 14, at 7.
300. See Eur. Parliament, Final Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA
for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, A6-9999/2007, 39 (Jan. 26, 2007).
301. See, e.g., Hentoff, supra note 288 (describing recent steps taken by German and Italian
prosecutors).
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evade judicial scrutiny over the detention conditions of persons whom
the United States may subject to perpetual detention.
While the current extraordinary rendition policy was being
developed, then-Chief White House lawyer Alberto Gonzales pushed
his team of attorneys in the White House and the Department of Justice
to be "forward leaning.""3 2 The extraordinary rendition program
demonstrates the effect of this "forward leaning" approach:
administration officials distort and manipulate clear judicial, statutory,
and treaty directives to reach conclusions that have no valid legal
foundation. In reviewing White House memoranda relating to torture,
some commentators have observed that attorneys providing advice to a
client regarding how to circumvent the law may be held complicit in the
resulting criminal conduct. Moreover, such attorneys may be violating
their professional obligations to make a good-faith effort to determine
the scope of the law, and to refer to relevant moral and ethical
considerations when giving advice. 3 A recent editorial comment in the
American Journal of International Law took note of the heightened
responsibilities of government attorneys in providing legal guidance on
matters relating to foreign relations:
[G]overnment attorneys also have responsibilities and
obligations of loyalty that go beyond those of private attorneys.
Thus, the government lawyer's "client" is not simply his or her
administrative superior, but also the government agency...for
which he or she works, the U.S. government as a whole, and
indeed the American public and its collective interests and
values. Moreover, government attorneys have a particular
obligation to act responsibly in formulating advice or arguments
regarding constitutional or international legal questions. For their
opinions on such matters may often not be subject to definitive
judicial or other impartial review; and even if government legal
views are in theory subject to review, it is well known that
national courts, other government agencies, and the Congress
302. Michael Isikoffet al., Torture's Path, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2004, at 54.
303. Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 692, 694 (2004); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 70-71 (2005) (arguing that the
"glaringly deficient legal analysis" in the memoranda resulted from the lawyers being "so fixated
on working around legal restrictions on the administration's actions"); Lederman, Part I, supra
note 165 (observing that the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda failed to explore the broader
legal context of the torture statute, and concluding that the purpose of the memoranda was to
provide "legal cover for conduct of questionable legality").
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have traditionally been especially deferential to such opinions.
Consequently, in practice there may be no "safety net" other than
these attorneys' own competence, care, integrity, and good faith;
it is only these professional qualities that protect against legal
advice or advocacy that might undermine the national interest in
respect for law, or subvert or erode the international legal order.
Finally, foreign policy decisions are often highly political,
and policymakers and others who influence policy are often
skeptical concerning the relevance of international law. Thus,
there may be strong pressures on government lawyers to "bend"
or ignore the law in order to support policy decisions-pressures
that responsible government attorneys have an obligation to
resist. For unless public officials are given competent, objective,
and honest advice as to the legal consequences of proposed
actions and decisions, they cannot make informed and intelligent
policy judgments or properly balance the national interests
involved." 4
Additionally, government lawyers who provide legal cover for illegal
and immoral acts foster a dangerous lack of conscience among those
responsible for implementing government policy. One former CIA
counter-terrorism official who was directly involved with the rendition
program admitted that he knew people transferred to places such as
Egypt would be tortured. When asked if that made the United States
complicit in torture, he responded, "You'll have to ask the lawyers."305
The U.S. policy of extraordinary rendition has also undermined the
rule of law and respect for human rights throughout the world. Professor
Noah Feldman noted, "[I]f the United States aimed to demand
accountability with international norms, it had better begin by actively
and visibly upholding these norms itself. Whatever the merits of
unilateralism in foreign policy, unilateralism in laws and morals is
incoherent and dangerous. ' When confronted about torture in Egypt,
the Prime Minister of Egypt recently responded, "Well, you know, we

304. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 303, at 693; see also Julie Angell, Ethics, Torture, and
MarginalMemoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557 (2005)
(examining whether the OLC memoranda violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct);
Feldman, supra note 50 (arguing that the torture memoranda "subverted the rule of law").
305. CBS News, supra note 36 (Michael Scheuer, former CIA counterterrorism official).
306. Feldman, supra note 50; see also Arbour, supra note 14 ("[S]upport for human rights
and the rule of law actually improves human security.").
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do what we have to, just like the United States."3 7 The U.S. efforts to
promote human rights are undermined when it criticizes countries such
as Egypt, Syria, and Uzbekistan for torturing prisoners, while
simultaneously delivering terror suspects to those countries for
interrogation and detention.3 °8
The tools of law may provide a solution. People subjected to
extraordinary rendition may raise habeas claims in U.S. courts to
challenge their transfers as violating the laws of the United States. The
use of the habeas statute to challenge extraordinary rendition will
strengthen judicial oversight when the executive is responsible for
persons being detained in violation of treaties and criminal statutes.
Yet even if those claims do not succeed, the administration, in its
effort to escape the reach of U.S. courts and potential criminal sanctions
under U.S. law, will inevitably encounter other jurisdictions. The fact
that such activities constitute crimes in the other countries and are
causing injury to other states' nationals provides one inherent safeguard
to protect against the extraterritorial illegal activity of U.S. agents. A
second safeguard is the international embarrassment that results when a
country purporting to be a champion of democracy and human rights is
known to be flagrantly violating its treaty obligations and to be
conspiring with the very countries it publicly criticizes for human rights
violations.3"9 Hence, by trying to avoid the reach of the U.S. legal
system, the architects and perpetrators of extraordinary rendition may
ultimately face significant legal and political repercussions beyond the
borders of the United States.

307. America's Mission: Debating Strategiesfor the Promotion of Democracy and Human
Rights: State Department Briefing, Hudson Institute, June 20, 2005 (statement of Tom
Malinowsky, Human Rights Watch); see also Peter Ford, Controversy Grows in Europe over CIA
JailNetwork, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 1, 2005, at 1 (quoting Guillaume Parmentier, head
of the French Center on the United States, "It makes the Americans look exceptionally
hypocritical to say that democracy should be spread everywhere and then encourage their allies to
do things outside the rule of law.") O'Sullivan, supra note 22 (observing that Jordanian
collaboration with the CIA has provided Jordan with "a free pass on human rights").
308. See America's Mission, supra note 307.
309. Cf Smith, supra note 29 (reporting that the British Parliament has charged that the
United States is responsible for grave human rights violations, the European Parliament and the
Council of Europe have criticized U.S. detention policies, and that the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights has excluded the United States from its membership and called
for hearings on conditions at Guantdtnamo).

